Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):624-630 (2010)

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri
Australian Catholic University
Michael Fara's ‘habitual analysis’ of disposition ascriptions is equivalent to a kind of ceteris paribus conditional analysis which has no evident advantage over Martin's well known and simpler analysis. I describe an unsatisfactory hypothetical response to Martin's challenge, which is lacking in just the same respect as the analysis considered by Martin; Fara's habitual analysis is equivalent to this hypothetical analysis. The feature of the habitual analysis that is responsible for this cannot be harmlessly excised, for the resulting analysis would be subject to familiar counter-examples
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.662.x
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References found in this work BETA

Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Dispositions and Antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.

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Citations of this work BETA

Disposition Ascriptions.Simona Aimar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1667-1692.
Recent Work on Dispositions.Troy Cross - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):115-124.
Conditionals, Dispositions, and Free Will.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 2014 - Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 58 (4):45–67.

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