This book examines the role of the EU in ensuring privacy and data protection on the internet. It describes and demonstrates the importance of privacy and data protection for our democracies and how the enjoyment of these rights is challenged by, particularly, big data and mass surveillance. The book takes the perspective of the EU mandate under Article 16 TFEU. It analyses the contributions of the specific actors and roles within the EU framework: the judiciary, the EU legislator, the (...) independent supervisory authorities, the cooperation mechanisms of these authorities, as well as the EU as actor in the external domain. Article 16 TFEU enables the Court of the Justice of the EU to play its role as constitutional court and to set high standards for fundamental rights protection. It obliges the European Parliament and the Council to lay down legislation that encompasses all processing of personal data. It confirms control by independent supervisory authorities as an essential element of data protection and it gives the EU a strong mandate to act in the global arena. The analysis shows that EU powers can be successfully used in a legitimate and effective manner and that this subject could be a success story for the EU, in times of widespread euroskepsis. It demonstrates that the Member States remain important players in ensuring privacy and data protection. In order to be a success story, the key stakeholders should be prepared to go the extra mile, so it is argued in the book. The book is based on academic research for which the author received a double doctorate at the University of Amsterdam and the Vrije Universiteit Brussels. It builds on a long inside experience within the European institutions, as well as within the community of data protection and data protection authorities. It is a must read in a time where the setting of EU privacy and data protection is changing dramatically, not only as a result of the rapidly evolving information society, but also because of important legal developments such as the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation. This book will appeal to all those who are in some way involved in making this regulation work. It will also appeal to people interested in the institutional framework of the European Union and in the role of the Union of promoting fundamental rights, also in the wider world.. (shrink)

The scope of European Union competence was central to the reform process that culminated in the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty competence provisions borrowed heavily from those in the Constitutional Treaty. Some provisions are contained in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but the detailed schema is in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 2 TFEU is the foundational provision, setting out the categories of competence and the consequences that flow from them. Article (...) 2(1) TFEU establishes the category of exclusive competence, which carries the consequence that only the Union can legislate and adopt legally binding acts. Article 2(2) TFEU defines shared competence. The treaty schema for competence in Article 2 TFEU is premised on the ascription of legal consequences for EU and member state power as the result of coming within a particular category. Article 5 TFEU is an exception in this respect. (shrink)

Citizenship of the European Union is a status that is held by every person who is a national of a member state of the Union. This chapter examines the history of Union citizenship, where it came from and how it developed over time. It then discusses the rights and duties of citizenship of the Union, explaining what they are and how they can be accessed. The chapter also looks at what citizenship of the Union means and where the issues are (...) regarding its relationship with nationality of the member states. Article 20(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains the genesis and determination of the status of citizen of the European Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship. Finally, the chapter comments on some of the current political challenges for this citizenship. (shrink)

As far as the judicial system is concerned, the legal actions that can be brought before the Union courts, the Court of Justice, the General Court, and specialized courts, do not provide for a comprehensive system of procedural remedies. The main procedural remedy to address this problem is the preliminary ruling procedure, which enables all national courts, and obliges some of them, to suspend the main proceedings before it and refer questions concerning the interpretation and validity of Union law to (...) the Court of Justice for a binding ruling. According to Article 267(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Court of Justice have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: the interpretation of the treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union. A decision of the Court of Justice is given in the form of a judgment. (shrink)

State aids law has become a major subject in its own right. Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which lays down the substantive rules on state aid, and Article 108 TFEU, which provides for the procedural rules, form part of the treaty chapter on competition. However, there are now several important pieces of legislation. The first is Council Regulation 994/98/EC, which applies Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. The gist of the (...) regulation is that the Commission is authorized to adopt block exemptions for certain categories of aid. On this basis, the Commission has adopted a number of regulations, which will be discussed in this chapter. The enforcement of the state aid rules by the Commission has been essential in containing the crisis. The Commission efforts have been supplemented by the policies of the European Central Bank, which provided enhanced credit support. (shrink)

This chapter exposes the tensions that afflict the shaping of European Union (EU) consumer law and policy and demonstrates that the relationship between EU and national consumer law is dynamic and not always coherent. A‐Punkt Schmuckhandels provides a good example of what it means to treat consumer protection as a shared competence. EU free movement law confines trade‐restrictive national measures to the area within which they can be justified, but it does not insist on their inevitable elimination. EU consumer policy (...) in its legislative dimension is predominantly the product of Article 114 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which succinctly deals with harmonization. EU consumer law and the project of market integration are intimately connected. Indeed, market integration is intended to yield beneficial effects for the consumer by improving competition and widening choice. (shrink)

This chapter reexamines the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the prism of the modern structure of the foundational treaties of the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Lisbon Treaty has reshaped the structure of the positive law of the EU, marking a new stage in the process of creating a closer union. For EU procedural law, this has led (...) to the formal establishment of three focal points which reflect the issues involved. At one extreme, are general principles of EU law, which have constitutional status including the general principle of effective judicial protection. In the middle of the spectrum are two provisions which recognize the balancing of national and EU interests required at the procedural level. Finally, the treaties recognize the possibility for substantive regulation at the EU level. (shrink)

The article aims at resolving the issue whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has an exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to resolve disputes between Member States, stemming from provisions of an international treaty, a party to which is the EU. This problem is especially relevant in cases when a mixed international agreement envisages independent institutions of dispute resolution. The position of the CJEU is expressed in (...) the case of Mox Plant. The European Commission applied to the CJEU against Ireland, because it considered that Ireland, which started an arbitration procedure against United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has infringed the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 344 of the TFEU. The EU is also a Contracting Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore according to the consistence case practice of the Court, the provisions of the Convention that fall under the competence of the Union constitute an indivisible part of the EU legal system. Only in such case when a provision of a treaty is attributed to exclusive competence of the Member States, the jurisdiction of the CJEU regarding that provision can be negated. Thus, when deciding on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU in principle, a problem of attribution of the EU and Member States’ competences arises. (shrink)

In its jurisprudence relating to Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union seems to oscillate between two different approaches. According to the jurisprudential mainstream, the preliminary ruling is an instrument of dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice. This constant dialogue can fulfill the role assigned to the Court to ensure consistency of interpretation and application of Union law. Another line of cases, however, seems to make preliminary rulings means for individuals to ensure (...) their rights which derive from EU law. These two visions of the preliminary references recently have been opposed in discussions about a particular aspect of the preliminary procedure, which is the late withdrawal of the question referred by the national court. In fact, when the national court considered that the response of the Court of Justice was not “necessary to render judgment,” it could, at any time, including both before and after the deliberate publication, date the judgment to the parties and remove this issue. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice became dependent on matters of procedure (dealings between the parties, amicable agreements, etc.) that occurred in extremis before the national court, which sometimes cast doubt on a possible manipulation of the Court by the parties to the main proceedings. It became necessary to find a solution to solve this problem. The two different visions were then compared. If the preliminary ruling is conceived as an additional instrument for the rights that individuals derive from EU law, there is no need for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make a decision when the dispute is resolved before the national court and the defendant has obtained satisfaction. Conversely, if the preliminary ruling is conceived as an instrument to ensure the uniform application and interpretation of EU law, this judgment may be necessary. In fact, without deciding in abstracto, the Court in its judgement will anchor an interpretation that should be applied in all similar cases in the courts of the 27 Member States. In this case, a judgment may still be necessary, even if the dispute before the national court ended off. In order to preserve this approach, the new Rules of Procedure now contain a provision in Article 100 (1) which reads as follows: “The Court shall remain seised of a request for a preliminary ruling for as long as it is not withdrawn by the court or tribunal which made that request to the Court. The withdrawal of a request may be taken into account until notice of the date of delivery of the judgment has been served on the interest persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute”. Thus, the late withdrawal of a request for a preliminary ruling is clearly limited in time and, even if such removal would occur in extremis, the judgment of the Court will be delivered in the interest of interpretation and uniform application of Union law. (shrink)

Abuse of a dominant position is one of the key aspects in EC competition law. The Court of Justice and General Court acknowledge that sometimes the actions of dominant undertaking that might be recognized as abusive should not be prohibited on the basis of Article 102 TFEU, if undertaking provides objective justification or proves that its actions generate positive effect which outweighs negative outcome on competition. Therefore, actions that usually are regarded as predatory pricing, which is one of the (...) forms of the abuse of a dominant position, in case of special circumstances might be recognized as legitimate. In the present case, attention should be devoted to objective justifications, since this provides the basis for evaluation of legitimate, pro-competitive reasons that explain why undertakings may establish prices lower than costs. This article is devoted to the analysis of objective justification, which might prove that allegedly abusive behaviour is actually legitimate. Plenty of factors might be recognized as objective justifications, therefore it is quite difficult to provide a finite list of justifications. (shrink)

One of the most important principles of EC law is the prohibition of the abuse of dominant positions as established in Article 102 TFEU. Predatory pricing is one of the forms of abuse of a dominant position. In order to decide whether the dominant undertaking has referred to predatory pricing it is necessary to evaluate several elements, one of which is analysis of the intent of the undertaking. European judicial institutions and Commission while assessing predatory pricing give too much (...) importance to the intent of the dominant undertaking. It should be recognized that intention to use predatory pricing is only additional evidence for the determination to undertake an abused dominant position. Intent to eliminate competitors and to take a big part in the market is the aim of all dominant undertakings, the driving force of competition. Competition law officers should inquire whether pricing will cause elimination of competitors and damage to consumers. If competition law officers will provide too much importance to consideration of intent in that case competition law rules will be applied to strict and dominant undertakings and will not charge low prices that are good for consumers. (shrink)

According to the International Relations theory known as Realism, interstate interactions, whether ancient or modern, are motivated by the pursuit of hegemony of individual states, which act as monolithic groups in articulating their foreign policy decisions. The application of Realism to the study of Spartan foreign policy in the third century BC shows the validity of this theory in explaining certain aspects of ancient interstate interactions, as illustrated by the two alliances discussed in this article. The first, earlier alliance, between (...) King of Macedonia Antigonos Gonatas and Sparta and some Peloponnesian cities, was made in response to the threat posed by King Pyrrhus of Epirus who was set on conquering them. The later alliance, between Sparta and other states, was made to stop the ambitions of King Antigonos Gonatas who controlled many cities of the Peloponnese and sought to conquer the whole of Greece. In forging such alliances, according to the Realist view, the states acted as large monolithic groups, yet a broader assessment of the available evidence shows the presence of smaller, subtler networks of individuals, which were paramount in articulating important foreign policy decisions. The comparison of Spartan decision making with the activation in 2009 of the EU’s Solidarity Clause, included in Article 222 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), indicates that the activation of this clause too required the consensus of several European governing bodies. By bringing to light the critical role played by smaller networks of power in foreign policy decision making in the ancient and the current-day EU alliances, this article exposes both the merits and the limits of the Realist international relations theory. (shrink)

The non-discrimination principle is one of the essential principles in the area of European public and private law too. The importance of this principle also takes a great place in field of company law, especially in the area of “freedom of establishment of the companies” in the European Single Market. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the general concept of “free movement of people, capital, goods and services,” in ESM. In fact, freedom of establishment is a substantive (...) part of the process of creation the internal market in EU. The freedom of establishment is based on the Treaty of the functioning of EU. According to article 49 from TFEU, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. This prohibition also applies to restrictions on setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. In-depth exploration of this issue is conditioned by the interpretation of the Court of justice of European Union, which embodies the real legal regime of freedom of establishment. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the principles of healthy and fair competition and equal access of the companies too. This article seeks to elaborate fundamental theoretical aspects of this issue, considering certain case - study analyze of CJEU judgements. The main focus is on the non-discrimination principle, legal effects of the CJEU judgments, free market and competitiveness, and finally, determination of the concept of primary and secondary establishment of companies in EU. (shrink)

The article discusses the possible consequences that can be faced by a Member State of the European Union if its national court does not comply with the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. The TFEU does not specify any sanctions applicable to a state when its national court disregards its obligation under Article 267 TFEU. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the practice of the Court of Justice and its interpretation by (...) scholars. At the outset, the author analyses whether refraining from making a reference for a preliminary ruling can lead to the duty to pay damages to an individual. Taking into account the criteria of a sufficiently serious breach formulated in the Köbler case, the author comes to the conclusion that the infringement of the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling is one of the most important criteria in assessing whether a Member State has to pay damages for any loss suffered by an individual, but the infringement itself is not sufficient to make a state liable. (shrink)

The legal regime of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is differentiated in two ways. While the rules on economic union apply with few exceptions to all member states, most Treaty provisions on monetary union are applicable only to those member states that have introduced the common currency. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes a system of overlapping competences consisting primarily of measures adopted by the member states. During the initial phase of the European (...) Economic Community (EEC), exchange‐rate fluctuations or flexible exchange rates obstructed the development of a workable capital market. The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the European Union is to establish a monetary union whose currency is the euro. The TFEU provides for institutional and procedural mechanisms aimed at protecting the stability of the common currency. The euro has become a stable and internationally recognized currency. (shrink)

In this article, we explore why solidarity has not worked according to expectation in EU migration and asylum law and why it is unlikely to work in the future. First, we consider discourses of burden-sharing and solidarity in EU law from the 1990s up to the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 to identify emergent path dependencies. This period saw the introduction of primary law provisions on solidarity, such as Article 80 TFEU, as French and Dutch electorates had rejected a European (...) constitution. Second, we perform an analysis of Article 80 through the conceptual history of solidarity, in particular, the dominant Roman law tradition of obligation in solidum and the French tradition of solidarism. We submit that the term ‘solidarity’ is actually a misnomer: already on structural grounds, Article 80 should be read as an alliance clause, countering a threat of irregular immigration. Third, we find that the practice under Article 80 as it develops during the period between 2015 and the 2020 European Commission Pact on Migration and Asylum corroborates this finding. Overall, we find that the concept of solidarity in EU asylum and migration law engenders outcome expectations that it cannot deliver as the defence alliance it is. (shrink)

This article aims to shed some light on the concepts embedded in the expressions ‘services of general interest’ (‘SGI’), ‘services of general economic interest’ (‘SGEI’), ‘non-economic services of general interest’ (‘NSGI’) and ‘social services of general interest’ (‘SSGI’). It is submitted that the expression ‘SGI’ conveys a general concept which comprises both SGEI and NSGI. SGEI may be distinguished from NSGI in that only the former involve an economic activity. In contrast to SGI, SGEI and NSGI, the expression ‘SSGI’ is (...) nowhere to be found in primary EU law. This means that it is for the EU legislator and, as the case may be, for the Member States to define such expression. Furthermore, this article supports the contention that a definition of the principles and conditions underpinning the operation of SGI must be capable of adapting to changing times and social perceptions, whilst being respectful of the vertical and horizontal allocation of powers set out in the Treaties. Vertically, a definition of SGI must not impinge upon the powers retained by the Member States. In the absence of harmonisation, it is for the Member States to define the services they consider to be of general interest, unless they commit a manifest error of assessment. In the presence of EU harmonising measures, the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member States is, if still existent, narrowed down, given that national authorities are required to comply with the objectives pursued by the EU legislator. Horizontally, a definition of SGI must not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Commission in the realm of competition law. Moreover, in light of Article 9 TFEU and secondary EU legislation, the specific features of SSGI must be taken into consideration when determining the compatibility with EU State aid rules of public service compensation awarded to the providers of those services. An EU conceptual framework for the SGI must thus be the result of a constructive dialogue between the different levels of governance, as well as of a balanced solution among different policy areas in relation to which the EU enjoys competences. (shrink)

This essay deals with conditions, challenges and perspectives concerning the legal system of the European Union after the Lisbon treaty has entered into force. It starts out by recalling constitutional principles such as primacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation of the European legal order on the one hand and the relationship of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts – notably pointing out the importance of the preliminary procedure (Article 267 TFEU) – on the other hand. In (...) addition, characteristics of the legal system of the European Union such as the integration of national legal systems are highlighted. It is accentuated that the legal community of the European Union depends on the acceptance by all 27 Member States. Furthermore, the normative quality of European law-making is discussed as well as the necessity for a sufficient democratic legitimation of European Law. As impressively illustrated by the financial crisis, the European Union is much better equipped with possibilities to effectively fulfil regulatory tasks than any Member State. The author shows developments with regard to European Union citizenship, non-discrimination, the Charter of Fundamental Rights - that is now equipped with binding character – and the vertical distribution of competences between the European Union and the Member States, including explanations relating to subsidiarity requirements and their judicial review. Moreover, challenges to the institutions of the European Union are discussed. (shrink)