Non-Muslim leadership is still being a political issue and causes polemic in Indonesia. The previous election of Governor of DKI Jakarta was remembering last controversy either probability or prohibition to vote a non-muslim as a chief. The law judgments addressing this issue are NU Congress at Lirboyo in 1999 and Bahtsul Masail Kiai Muda GP Ansor in 2017. According to Congress at Lirboyo, authorizing state affairs to a non-Muslim is not allowed, except in an emergency situation. Meanwhile, Bahtsul Masailof Kiai (...) Muda Ansor in 2017 decided that voting non-Muslim leader in Indonesia is legally and constitutionally legitimate. This paper is trying to examine istinbat method which is used in those two forums considering their position in the theory of al-Sabit and al-Mutahawwil. By conducting a literature study, the author concludes that the outcomes of Muktamar NUat Lirboyo in 1999 using the istinbat Bayani method, belongs to al-Sabit category. Meanwhile, the outcomes of Bahtsul Masail Kiai Muda GP Ansor in 2017 which is using a combination of istinbat Bayani and istislahi, belongs to an al-Mutahawwil category. (shrink)

Tahâvî (v. 321/ 933), hicrî üçüncü asrın sonları ile dördüncü asrın başlarında yaşamış Hanefî fakihidir. Tahâvî’nin daha çok muhaddis olarak tanınmasına rağmen hadis ve fıkha derin vukufiyeti, her iki alana da temas eden hadis-sahâbî kavlî münasebetini onun üzerinden incelemeyi daha anlamlı kılmaktadır. Müctehid fakihlerin hüküm istinbâtında başvurduğu sahâbî kavlî, Hz. Peygamber’e dayanması bakımından semâ/tevkif ihtimali bulunan bir delildir. Bu sebeple sahâbî kavlini sünnet birlikte değerlendirmenin lüzumu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca Tahâvî’nin sahâbî kavli ile sünnet arasında net bir ayırım yapmaması, Hanefî usûlünün (...) teşekkül süreci açısından önemlidir. Tahâvî, ictihad usûlü anlayışında sahâbî kavline deliller hiyerarşisinde Kur’an, sünnet ve icmâdan sonra yer vermektedir. Eserlerindeki tercihleri dikkate alındığında Tahâvî, sahâbî kavlini tevkife hamlettiği yerlerde sünnet olarak değerlendirmektedir. Hatta sahâbî kavli ve uygulamasının icmâa dönüştüğü durumda sünneti neshedebilecek mertebede gördüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Tahâvî ictihadî olan, re’y ve te’vil ifade eden sahâbî kavlini ise mutlak delil almayıp bu durumdaki sahâbî kavli karşısında kıyasa gitmektedir. Tahâvî’nin sünnete ve sahâbî kavline bakışı birlikte değerlendirildiğinde dönemin hadis anlayışı gereği, sünnetin çerçevesini sahâbe ve tâbiûn kavillerini dahil ederek geniş kapsamda ele aldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Erken dönem Hanefî usûlünde sahâbî kavli hakkında Tahâvî’nin görüşlerinin incelendiği araştırmada metin incelemesi ve analizi yöntemi kullanılmış; Tahâvî’ye ait eserler ile erken dönem Hanefî usûl-i fıkıh eserleri mukâyeseli olarak ele alınmıştır. (shrink)

Modern dönemde iletişim ve ulaşımda teknolojinin gelişmesiyle birlikte dünya küçük bir köy haline gelmiştir. Bu dönemde Batı sistemi maneviyatı ve ahireti bırakıp maddiyat ve dünya için belli araç ve gereçleri üreterek modern medya alanına egemen olma gücünü elde etmiştir. Bu durum özellikle İslam’a saldıran söylemlerin tırmanması, dini gruplara saldırıların artması ve İslami içeriklerle savaşın büyümesiyle birlikte İslami medyayla uğraşanların hitap önceliklerini tekrar gözden geçirmelerini gerekli kılmıştır. Aslında bu meydan okumalar İslam medyasının daha önce sıkıntısını yaşadığı ve halen de devam eden (...) sorunlara dayanmaktadır. Medya alanında çalışılabilecek çok sayıda konu bulunmaktadır. Bunlar arasında en az tercih edilen konu ise makâsıd ya da evleviyyât bakış açısı ve makâsıd ictihâdı çerçevesinde medyaya bakma konusudur. Bu çalışmada bu konu araştırma konusu olarak seçilmiştir. Bu konunun seçimi, birtakım varsayımlara dayanmaktadır. En önemlisi de makâsıd ilminin ölçü olması ve evleviyyât fıkhıdır. Bu ölçü genel olarak medya ilminin öncüleri ve özel olarak da İslami medyanın öncüleri için makâsıd bakışını sunabilen bilişsel teorilerin ve yöntemsel imkânların amaçladığı önemli niteliklerden biridir. Böylece makalenin sorusu şu şekilde ifade edilebilir: Ümmetin kalkınmasını, liderliğini ve diğer milletler üzerindeki etkisini gerçekleştirmek amacıyla makasıdü’ş-şerî‘aya dayalı öncelikler fıkhının kuralları, çağdaş medya alanına nasıl uygulanabilir? Bu çalışma iki bölümde ele alınmıştır. Birinci bölümde medya alanındaki öncelikler fıkhı kavramı ve bu alandaki bu fıkhı dikkate almanın delilleri ele alınmıştır. İkinci bölümde öncelikler fıkhının kurallarını modern medya alanına tatbik etme konusu ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca makâsıd kuralları, nevazil fıkhının kuralları ve vesail kuralları olan üç kural çeşidine göre her bir mertebe için örnekler verilmiştir. Bu düşünceyi temellendirmenin birçok yönü bulunmaktadır. Fakat bu konu iki yönden ele alınmıştır. Birincisi medya yönündür. Burada öncelikleri modern medya ilminde düzenleme teorisi ele alınmıştır. İkincisi makâsıd yönüdür. Burada makâsıdü’ş-şeri‘a ilmine dayanan önceliklerin kuralları ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışmada biraz karşılaştırma yöntemi kullanmanın yanı sıra genel olarak niteleme, tahlil ve istinbât yöntemleri kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışma neticesinde makâsıd ilmini medya alanıyla ilgili ictihâdî bakışta işletmenin zaruri olduğuna ve bunun bilimsel bir lüks olmayıp zorunlu olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Ayrıca modern İslami düşünce medyasının genel olarak makâsıdü’ş-şeri‘a ölçüleri ve özel olarak da hitap ve medya makâsıdının ölçüleriyle yönlendirmesi gerektiği sonucu elde edilmiştir. Medyanın yakın, orta ve uzak stratejilerini geliştirerek evleviyyât fıkhını işler hale getirmenin zorunlu olduğunu öneriyoruz. Ayrıca medya ve makâsıdü’ş-şeri‘a alanlarında araştırma yapan ve bu ilimlerle meşgul olanların medyayı makâsıd fıkhıyla çerçeveleme ve medya alanında makâsıdı çalıştırma konusunda ortak ciddi çalışmalar yapmalarını öneriyoruz. (shrink)

Fıkıh literatüründe sünnet önemli bir yere sahiptir. Çünkü fıkhın temeli Hz. Peygamber tarafından atılmış ve fıkhın gayesini en iyi bilen ve uygulayan kendisi olmuştur. Bu sebeple şer’î amelî konularda hüküm istinbatı için müctehid imamlar, Kur’an’dan sonra sünnete başvurmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte müctehid imamlar, Hz. Peygamber’den gelen rivayetlerin bazılarını kabul ve onlarla amel etmede görüş ayrılıkları yaşamışlardır. Görüş ayrılıklarının temelinde ise sünnetin ekseriyetini teşkil eden haber-i vâhid vardır. Çünkü haber-i vâhid yapısal açıdan yalan, yanlışlık ve vehm ihtimali bulundurması yanında doğruluğu zan ile (...) sabit olması sebebiyle özellikle Hanefî usûlcülerine göre bilgi ifade etmez. Bu yönüyle haberi vâhid, mütevâtir haber kadar kuvvetli ve bağlayıcı olmayıp zannî bir bilgi ifade eder. Bu doğrultuda haber-i vâhid, “bilgi gerektirmez, zan gerektirir” şeklinde ifade edilmiştir. Bu ifade bağlamında şöyle bir soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: Haber-i vâhid, bilgi ifade etmediği halde, onunla amel edilmesi mümkün müdür? Bu sorudan hareketle zan ifade eden haber-i vâhidin hücceti ve onunla amel edilmesinin mümkün olup olmadığını, mezheplerin haber-i vâhide yaklaşımlarının nasıl olduğunu ve bu durumun cenaze bahsine ilişkin hükümlere nasıl yansıdığını ortaya koymak amacıyla bu çalışma ele alınmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın konusu, haber-i vâhidin hücceti için mezheplerin ileri sürdüğü farklı şartlar ve bu şartların hükümlere -cenaze namazı özelinde- etkisi ile sınırlıdır. Yöntem olarak öncelikle kavramsal çerçevede haber-i vâhidi tanımlamak, bilgi değerini ortaya koymak ve mezheplerin onunla hücceti noktasında benimsedikleri şartları tespit etmek amacıyla ilgili mezheplerin usûl eserleri incelenmiştir. Daha sonra mezheplerin benimsediği bu usûlî yöntem, cenaze bahsindeki yerini belirlemek üzere ilgili mezheplerin fürû kitapları taranmıştır. Bu metottan hareketle mezheplerin usûlde benimsediği ilkenin fürû meselelerine nasıl yansıdığı, haber-î vâhidin zannî bilgi ifade etmesine rağmen onunla amel etmenin gerekçesi ve cenazeye ilişkin bazı hükümlerde mezheplerin farklı hüküm benimsemelerinin nedeni ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

Unlike Hanafī jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiyās is permissible (jāʿiz) for the origins (aṣl) in which the qiyās rule is invalid, including ruhsat (permission); kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalties). Shāfiʿī jurists, Imam al-Shāfiʿī and his followers like al-Juwaynī, argue that Hanafī jurists are contradictory since they apply qiyās in many cases despite their judgment that qiyās is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiyās format. Nevertheless, (...) Shāfiʿī jurists persist that they rule on the qiyās applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinbāt) such as Islamic juristic preference (istiḥsān), even beyond qiyās. In his sense of search effective cause: ʿilla (taʿlil), al-Juwaynī focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (munāsaba). He runs the mechanism of taʿlil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (munāsaba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the qiyās’ rule is invalid. Kaffarah and ḥadd consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiyās. Al-Juwaynī’s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for qiyās. In this paper, the aim of study is to identify the borders and limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī’s thought with discussions about the disagreements between the jurists in the specified areas.Summary: As a general principle, devoting (taʿabbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and reasoning (taʿaqqul/taʿlīl) for Abu Hanīfa. Despite this, Abu Hanīfa and Hanafī jurists consider non-qiyās foundations (ma’dul bih ‘anil-qiyās) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddarāt/taqdīrat) and ruhsat (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiyās) and profess that qiyās cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is taʿaqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiyās. On the contrary to their general approach, Shāfiʿī jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to qiyās. Al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and one of his followers, al-Juwaynī, describe that Hanafī jurists’ applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinbāt) (e.g. juristic preference: istiḥsān), furthering qiyās although they take qiyās as illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd. However, Hanafī jurists defend that they are not in a contradiction, and indeed they do not apply qiyās in kaffarah and ḥadd and derive their illations mostly from textual implications (dalālah) that are mostly out of qiyās format such as tanqīh al-maʿnā (isolating ʿilla), istidlāl, and dalālah al-naṣṣ (inferred meaning). As understood from the relevant arguments, applying qiyās in these areas is directly associated with the issue of potentiality for “the analogy in reason.” The type of qiyās that Hanafī jurists consider illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd is the analogical actions made for the reasons. One of the most rationalist representatives of Shāfiʿī uṣūl, al-Juwaynī pronounces that the method to determine ʿilla (cause) is fundamentally the suitability (munāsaba) that can be defined as “rational compatibility.” In his opinion, the ratiocination (taʿlīl) is based on this suitability. According to him, the indications of qiyās will be clear or it becomes practicable even in the presence of low-level, implicit suitability. Al-Juwaynī considers that it is licit to apply the analogy for the kaffarah and ḥadd as well as the non-qiyās foundations, including ruhsat and muqaddarāt or taqdīrat, whether direct or explicit (i.e. the meaning of analogy: qiyās al-maʿnā) or indirect or implicit (i.e. the commonality of analogy: qiyās al-shabah). In this context, one of Juwayni’s concern is “the matter of inherence in textual sources such as naṣṣ or the Qur’ān and the Sunna),” corresponding to the area where the judgment is based on a specific reason by naṣṣ. For him, a number of reasonable meanings can be inferred in these areas when it is critiqued independent of the uttered words. But the inherence mentioned in the texts of naṣṣ, indicates to avoid the use of analogy for making a judgment. Al-Juwaynī asserts that some fractional elaborate or detailed meanings cannot be obtained for physical prayers and only a set of universal meanings can be imagined. He defines that it is permissible to compare the reasons of physical worshipping with each other when any suitable meaning is present. He considers that for the permissibility of qiyās in ruhsat, it is adequate to find a meaning suitable for the judgment, and besides, the commonality of analogy (qiyās al-shabah) is applicable in the area of muqaddarāt or taqdīrat. Nevertheless, a patient’s condition is similar to that of a traveller in terms of ruhsat for not fasting (ṣavm). In al-Juwaynī’s way of thinking, patients should act like travellers for ruhsat to shorten (qaṣr) the prayers (ṣalāh) due to “requiring” as a proper meaning. However, as mentioned by al-Juwaynī, there is a consensus (ʿijmā or ittifāq) on the fact that a patient cannot shorten his or her prayers. Due to this impediment, it is understood that the rule of shortening their prayers (ṣalāh) is permissible for travellers but not for patients (manʿ al-ʿijmā’).In criminal cases, the right of oath before the court is belonging to the defendant, whereas to the claimant in kasāme, an oath method in unidentified murders. Taking an oath from the claimant is merely inherent to the kasāme application. Al-Juwaynī states that this inherence is known by the principle of being inherent to each circumstance (iḥtisās bi-l hāl), and with this aspect, kasāme is a closed area for qiyās. According to al-Juwaynī, contracts are suitable for qiyās because they have conditions such as offers and agreements explicitly stating the quality and quantity, and mutual assent. He describes that these are the reasons unavailable for qiyās with respect to their characteristics. With this, the contracts are among the reasonable sources in one respect and the unreasonable in another respect. Consequently, al-Juwaynī suggests that the analogy loses its functionality or validity in a limited number of the closed areas for qiyās, which are the static devotional judgments (taʿabbud) having no proper meaning, direct or indirect, or explicit or implicit; the areas where the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the naṣṣ (ihtisās bi-l-nass) (as in the example that sacrificing a female goat at the age of less than one year is a specific judgment for Burde b. Niyār). The point leads to the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the principle of ihtisās bi-hāl; and banned ʿijmā issues (as in the example of ʿijmā that it is agreed on the fact that patients cannot shorten (qaṣr) their prayers (ṣalāh), unlike travellers. Al-Juwaynī sees the application of qiyās as licit based on the availability of suitable meaning in all areas except for the above-mentioned issues. That he minimizes the closed areas for qiyās and widely expands the functionality of analogy is the reflections of the value that he gives to qiyās. (shrink)

Understanding the nusus and the interpretation of their texts has been at the center of the activities of many schools and ulama in fiqh studies, and as a result, each school of usool has sought to find a method suitable for their own understanding in order to understand and interpret the nusus in a sahih way. For this purpose, fiqh schools have developed some unique methods. It can be said that the main differences among the hukms that fiqh schools rely (...) on are generally due to these methodological differences. One of the efforts to understand and interpret through the linguistic structures and patterns of the nusus is tawīl. For this reason, it is necessary to know conceptions of tawīl in order to accurately determine the hukm giving methods of fiqh schools. In this context, the thought of Zâhiri Ṭawīl, which is based on the zâhiri meaning of the words in the language and aims to solve the meaning pattern of the nusus within the framework of the rules of the language, is important. To this end, the tawīl understanding of Ibn Hazm (d. 543/1148), one of the leading ulama of Zâhiri thought, has an important position in the determination of their understanding of fiqh and usool. For this purpose, by searching the works of Ibn Hazm, how his understanding of tawīl, which he used as a method, is reflected in his fiqh thought, will be examined through his fiqhi inferences. The Qur’an used their language when addressing the societies. The Qur'an especially, on the one hand, has used the language they use to convey its messages to its interlocutors in a correct and understandable way, on the other hand, it has used a unique style without departing from the natural structure of the language in unseen matters due to the nature of religious language. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the words of the texts in order to understand and interpret the language used. The word tawīl was used by the ilm circles in the first period to mean the same as the word tafsir and in naming the works written as the Qur’an tafsir, the word tawīl was preferred instead of tafsir. Mâturîdî, the writer of the first dirayah tafsir, which points to the distinction between tafsir and tawīl, defines the word tafsir as 'to express exactly what is the meaning and purpose of the Qur'an, which is the divine word' and states that tafsir can be done only by the the Ṣaḥābah who knows Quran and Sunnah well. According to one of the many theses about the origin of language, it is God given. In other words, language has been taught to man by a supreme power (Allah). Ibn Hazm also defends this view. According to Ibn Hazm, the basic elements / elements of the language were taught by Allah to Adam (a.s), and then people developed this language in proportion to their needs. Therefore, the indications of the words depend on the declarations of God and linguistic experience. As a matter of fact, Allah has attributed new meanings to words such as salat, allegiance, hajj and similar words used for other meanings in the custom of language, and the new meanings attributed to them are accepted as the truth for the meanings of these words. Usûlists who adopted the method of fuqaha in usool, in the methods of istinbat of hukm out of sharii dalils, have generally made the taqseem of the words in terms of the meaning they were given to as âm, khâs, mushtarak and muavval while their taqsseem in terms of the words’ being used or not in the sense they were given was haqiqat, majaz, sarih and kinayah. Compared to other schools, the issue of tawīl has a different meaning according to the Zâhirî usûlists and faqih who base on the zâhiri khitab. Since the zâhir of the nusus is primary and essential, there should be a certain usool, principle and rule to give up the zâhir of the nusus and to switch to another possible meaning. Ibn Hazm states that there are different opinions among the usûlists about whether the imperative form is indicant of hukm. He also says that according to some Hanafi, Malikî and Shafii usûlists, as long as there is no evidence showing that it is wujub, tahrim, nedb, ibahâ and karahah, then the imperative form cannot be views as indicating a hukm. (shrink)

This article tries to contextualise the formulation of Islamic laws with regards to contemporary dynamics of non-Muslim leadership in the government. It particularly addresses the religious deliberation of the traditionalist Muslim organisation, the Nadhlatul Ulama/NU, and its youth organisation, the Gerakan Pemuda Ansor. The construction of Islamic laws in contemporary Indonesia tells an insightful viewpoint in Islamic-laws making and delivers multiplicity in Islamic interpretation. Despite the fact that these two organisations are of the same organisation, the NU, their formulation of (...) Islamic laws with regards to non-Muslim leadership demonstrates a different and contrasting opinion. While the national board of the NU through its national congress in 1999 argues against non-Muslim leadership, the national religious deliberation board of the Ansor in 2017 issues a legal opinion that approves non-Muslim leadership. As this article argues, the different opinions between these two institutions develops particularly because of different construct in defining Islam and democracy in the largest Muslim country Indonesia. They differ in reconciling istinbat of two principles of Islamic laws ; al-sabit and al-mutahawwil. It further argues that the national board of the NU particularly sees the prohibition of non-Muslim leadership as al-sabit, an unchanged dictum, whereas the Ansor considers it al-mutahawwil as looking at the Indonesian state constitution that does not discriminate its citizens based on religion. Thus, making Islamic laws accords to the state constitution. (shrink)

At the end of the verses 44th, 45th, and 47th of the Surat al-Māʾida, it is seen that those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are described as unbelievers, oppressors, and fāsiqs with the general expression. Especially in verse 44th of the surah, the fact that those who do not judge by Allah's revelations are characterized as misbelievers has been a subject of debate since the early period. Many different opinions have been expressed by the mufassirs about (...) who are included in this scope, who are the addressees of the verse, whether the” kufr” here is blasphemy in the form of denying Allah and leaving the religion, or is it a different type of “kufr”. As it is understood from the information in the sources regarding the asbāb al-nuzūl of these verses were revealed as the Jews destroyed the provisions set by Allah in the Torah, changed them with various ways, and discriminated between people in various ways and applied them. With the relevant verses in Sūrah al-Māʾida, all these injustices, lawlessness, and unfairness were made away and the Jews who committed them were strongly criticized. In this regard, it is seen that some commentators have devoted themselves to the reason for the verdict of the relevant verses and interpreted the characterizations in the verse as infidels, cruel, and fāsiqs as covering only the Jews who committed these acts. However, even if the information about the contents of the relevant verses shows that these verses are about the Jews, this does not mean that the scope of the verse should be limited to them. Because both the universality of the messages of the Qur'an in general and the fact that the address in the verses came in a public way do not allow these provisions to be allocated only to a certain group. In addition, according to the rules of istinbat, the fact that the reason for making a religious provision is specific does not prevent the generalization of it. When considered within the framework of the principles we have explained, it becomes clear that narrowing down the provisions of the verses by allocating them only to a certain group is not a correct approach. In this article, it is aimed to draw attention to the richness of meaning that emerges when the relevant verses are evaluated in terms of the types of indications in the fiqh method. When the verses within our subject are evaluated in terms of the types of indications, it is seen that these verses indicate that the implementation of a provision in force cannot be avoided. In the relevant verses, it's concluded that important principles and rules of law such as the realization of justice, the rule of law, equality before the law, no one's being privileged in the sight of the law, the powers of the head of state are limited, that there is no place for ijtihad where Allah's clear judgment exists. (shrink)

In legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), the problem of the defining istiḥsān and the legitimacy of its definition is among the critical discussion topics. To overcome the rigorism of law, istiḥsān was used by the founder scholars of Ḥanafī school of law and Malik b. Anas - however this use received various objections. Although the Mālikī scholars also used istiḥsān strong criticisms of istiḥsān have been directed on the Ḥanafīs. After the severe criticism of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the Ḥanafī scholars (...) carried out various intellectual activities to define istiḥsān and to prove that it is legitimate. This process -which started especially with Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, revealed a rich accumulation with the contribution of the legal theorists in other school of laws. It is known that al-Karkhī's definition of istiḥsān has become widespread among the legal theorists, and the legitimacy of istiḥsān in the works of legal theory was based on his definition. Al-Karkhī's considerations on the legaliticamy of using istiḥsān can be traced in his student al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in the following centuries, Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, Abū l-‘Usr al-Bazdawī and al-Sarakhsī’s works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ' explanations on the legitimacy of istiḥsān begin with the criticism of Imam al-Shāfiʿī's against istiḥsān. He provides the proof of legitimacy for istiḥsān in divided two sub-headings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who deals with istiḥsān in two parts as word and meaning, argues that there is no disagreement about the use of istiḥsān and that all mujtahids accept istiḥsān, and even al-Shāfiʿī, who opposes to the use of istiḥsān, employs istiḥsān in this sense. The type of istiḥsān on which there is a deabte is the istiḥsān used in relation to its meaning. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that this use is a qiyas operation; he justifies his point of view by referring to the works of Muḥammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī. Indeed, when we look at how al-Shaybānī explained the istiḥsān’s examples in his works, it is seen that there are two conflicting juristic analogy (qiyas) made in many examples. Moreover, al-Shaybānī openly considered some types of istiḥsān part of qiyas by stating that some examples “can be included in this type of istiḥsān” Ḥanafī scholars wanted to break the hostile atmosphere toward istiḥsān by defining and evaluating the istiḥsān in a way that their opponents could accept. The definition of Istiḥsān “to abandon the judgment given to similar ones due to stronger evidence.” has been generally accepted. In this definition, istiḥsān is defined by associating with qiyas, and referred to an istihsan that is presented as the more substantial evidence, and qiyas is the weaker evidence. Although it is appropriate to define istiḥsān in relation to qiyas, the claim that in the definition istiḥsān is put in stronger place than qiyas might casuse to some the contradictions- in particular when the example’s of al-Shaybānī are taken into consideration. Because in most cases, when qiyas conflicts with istiḥsān, istiḥsān is taken. But in an opposite case, qiyas might be taken. Apart from these, there are examples of the types of istiḥsān that al-Karkhī has classified in the works of al-Shaybānī, but sometimes there are also strange situations such as taking the qiyas by istiḥsān. This also means that the term is not sufficiently defined. The negative attitude towards istiḥsān in some Shāfiʿī circles and the criticisms against the legitimacy of istiḥsān continued in the works of the fiqh method. Istiḥsān is defined as making a judgment without evidence by Shāfiʿī circles. Therefore, they did not accept the abandonment of qiyas, which is a sharī proof, because of istiḥsān, which is a non-sharī notable proof. Based on the examples given by the users of istiḥsān, Ibn Ḥazm, one of the Ẓāhirītes, claims that istiḥsān opens the door to arbitrariness. According to him, a situation that is accepted as istiḥsān according to Ḥanafīs can be taken as istiḥsān according to Mālikīs. This creates an apparent contradiction. There are some valid points in the assessment of Ibn Ḥazm. Because while it is seen that the istiḥsān of Mālikīs is criticized in al-Shaybānī's book named al-Ḥujjah, it can be also found that the istiḥsān of Ḥanafīs is charged in the works of Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī, one of the Mālikīs. The criticism toward istiḥsān was continued by Shāfiʿīs such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. While al-Juwaynī sees istiḥsān as a method based on the lust of the soul, not istinbat/legal deduction, al-Ghazālī understands istiḥsān as a personal comment. The main reason for the negative attitude towards istiḥsān is that the content based on the definitions, has been neglected most of the time. However, when we look at the works of al-Shaybānī, it can be seen that there is a proof of istiḥsān contrary to what is believed-and that this can be sometimes a work, sometimes a necessity, sometimes another comparison, or sometimes a custom. (shrink)

The issue of morality is a universal phenomenon that is spoken and discussed above religions. There are moral values that every society accepts depending on their sociological and psychological conditions. From the first moment Islam came to the Arab society, it began to organize and renew the moral values of the society. As a model of the regulated and renewed moral values, The Prophet is shown. In this context, the moral consequences of the confusion in the Islamic society after the (...) death of the Prophet and the criticisms of the sufis who emerged as a reaction to the corruption in the society occur. Although the fields of fiqh and kalam discuss different issues in their formation processes, a particular section on morality does not appear to exist in the fields of fiqh and kalam. The sufis criticize the neglection of the field of morality in Islamic disciplines, and highlight the need of elimination of this deficiency. Sufis who lived in the early period claim that the solution that would fill this gap and help Islamic thought reach perfection is sufism. In order to justify this claim, they produce works attempting to prove that sufism is an independent discipline like kalam and fiqh. In this process, sufism transforms from a practical and ascetic understanding into a discipline that produces knowledge like other religious disciplines. (shrink)