The 2010 Quinnipiac cheerleading case raises interesting questions about the nature of both cheerleading and sport, as well as about the moral character of each. In this paper we explore some of those questions, and argue that no form of college cheerleading currently in existence deserves, from a moral point of view, to be recognized as a sport for Title IX purposes. To reach that conclusion, we evaluate cheerleading using a quasi-legal argument based on the NCAA’s definition of sport and (...) conclude that cheerleading fails to qualify as a legitimate sport. A philosophical argument leads to the same conclusion, primarily because of the essential entertainment-aspect of cheerleading. We then examine a consequentialist moral case for making cheerleading an intercollegiate sport and argue that the balance of moral reasons is against doing so. Finally, we look at cheerleading’s newest offspring – Acrobatics and Tumbling, and STUNT – and express our moral reservations about their current claims to be worthy of Title IX recognition. While we would not claim that any single one of our arguments is decisive, we are convinced that the cumulative weight of the arguments against granting intercollegiate sport status to any of the forms of cheerleading or its derivatives is, at present, irresistible. (shrink)

: According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath's popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, (...) and his revisionist interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation cannot bear the considerable weight of the countervailing evidence. (shrink)

Kant's moral theory, along with Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics, is one of the three leading moral theories in contemporary Western moral philosophy. I argue in this dissertation, however, that Kant's moral theory suffers from deeper flaws than its proponents have acknowledged---flaws that render it untenable. But a great deal of interpretative argument must be done before this critique can be compelling, since every critique rests on interpretative presuppositions that are liable to be questioned. Hence the dissertation also spends significant time (...) working out the most charitable reconstruction of the "supreme principle" of Kant's moral theory, the Categorical Imperative. ;Chapter I is devoted to identifying which of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative should be taken as most plausible and most worth critical examination. I argue in favor of the so-called Formula of the Law of Nature. Chapter II analyzes the crucial concept of a maxim---what a maxim contains and how maxims are to be identified---and defuses two common types of objection to the Categorical Imperative that rest on misunderstandings of the nature of a maxim. In Chapter III, I argue against several leading Kantian ethicists that Kant takes all nonmoral motives to be self-interested, aiming at one's own pleasure; this thesis is presupposed at a number of points by my interpretation of Kant's moral theory. Chapter IV explicates the Universalizability Test that follows from the Formula of the Law of Nature, with particular attention given to Kant's famous four examples from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Finally, Chapter V develops a number of criticisms of the Universalizability Test, considering and rebutting defenses that prominent Kantian ethicists have utilized or would be likely to utilize. (shrink)