The thesis that I wish to discuss in this paper is the next: Human Sciences (Cultural Sciences according to Dilthey, Historic-Hermeneutic sciences according to Habermas) are possible as far as the method that should make all of them possible can be epistemologically justified, this method is the hermeneutic understanding of meaning, whose central point is, in fact, the hermeneutic circle. The matter is to try to justify epistemologically the hermeneutic as understanding the meaning of the own and the other ones (...) life experiences within reflexivity and reciprocity that impregnates the structure of ordinary language. In the dialogue Habermas to Dilthey, in Knowledge and Human Interests appear many arguments to this foundation. Our text will make special emphasis in the next items: distinction between natural sciences and cultural sciences, hermeneutic understanding of meaning, ordinary language and reflexivity, specificity of the hermeneutic circle, science an vital context, and, finally, we are going to make an account of the Habermas interpretation of the Dilthey start point in bases to the relationships between Historic-hermeneutic sciences and the practice interest of the knowledge. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objeto poner de manifiesto las claves suarecianas de la teoría de la libertad, de acuerdo con las cuales la libertad es una potencia activa de la voluntad que, si bien se muestra indiferente en el acto de elección, sin embargo, se trata de una indiferencia activa, en la medida en que el ser humano ejerce una específica causalidad por libertad que tiene su fundamento metafísico en la teoría del acto virtual. El hombre es libre porque el (...) concurso divino no determina el acto de la voluntad libre, sino que deja al libre arbitrio humano la decisión de actuar o no actuar, de hacer una cosa o su opuesta. (shrink)