In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle states that human beings are starting points of things that could be otherwise and that the eph’hemin are this kind of things. Famously, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle endorses the thesis of habits’ unidirectionality, according to which the agent who already possesses moral habits, hexeis, will perform only actions consistent with the habits she possesses. Despite this apparent inconsistency, I aim to show that the two texts can be harmonized and that the Eudemian Ethics can (...) actually provide a theoretical background for habits’ unidirectionality. (shrink)

In Eth. Nic. V 8, Aristotle provides a classification of damages an agent may do, establishing degrees of culpability. In doing so, Aristotle recalls what he said about voluntary and involuntary actions in the preceding books about voluntary and involuntary actions. In this paper, I defend the thesis according to which the Eudemian account on voluntariness is consistent with the classification of damages Aristotle provides in Eth. Nic. V 8, arguing that one of Aristotle’s concerns in dealing with voluntariness is (...) the legal practices of his time, which we can regard as strongly linked to his discussion on moral responsibility. Thereby, I challenge David Charles’ view that the account of voluntariness featured in the book on justice differs both from the Nicomachean account and the Eudemian one. (shrink)