역설적⋅모순적 언어는 일상적으로는 접근 불가능한 심오한 종교적⋅철학적 통찰을 나타내기 위해 종종 사용되지만, 논리적으로 명료한 설명을 목적으로 하는 논서나 주석서에서는 그 사용을 억제하려는 경향이 강하다. 불교 인식논리학, 곧 인명(因明=hetuvidyā) 전통의 오류론 역시 비슷한 목적에서 출현하였다. 이러한 인명 전통에 대해서 서양의 분석철학 전통과의 비교 연구가 종종 행해지지만, 인명 관련 문헌에는 난해한 용어와 예시가 많이 등장하고, 그 문헌들의 한역과 주석 과정에서도 각종 난제들이 제기되었다. 본 논문은 『인명정리문론』과 『인명입정리론』에 소개된 ‘회토비월(懷兎非月=acandraḥ śaśī)’의 논증식을 분석하기 위한 예비적 단계로서 디그나가(Dignāga=陳那)가 고안한 인명학의 주요 개념에 대한 분석적 (...) 이해를 도모한다. 이를 위해 먼저 논증식의 일반적 구성 요소인 삼지(三支)와 인(因)의 삼상(三相) 개념은 약간의 수정을 가하면 현대 기호논리나 벤 다이어그램으로 나타낼 수 있음을 확인한다. 특히 삼지작법은 형식적으로 아리스토텔레스의 삼단논법과 유사해 보이지만, 근거나 예시를 경험 속에서 확인할 수 있어야 한다는 존재 함축을 지닌다는 점에서 연역 추리와 귀납 논리의 결합을 보여준다. 이는 또한 삼단논법의 시각적 이해를 위해 널리 활용되는 벤 다이어그램을 통해 논증식을 표시할 때 특정 구역이 공집합인지 아닌지를 통해 검토하여 그 논리적 타당성을 검증할 수 있음을 의미한다. ‘회토비월’ 논증식의 논리적 타당성 검토 또한 이에 기초해서 이루어져야 할 것이다. (shrink)

The present chapter sketches the adoption of logic in late nineteenth and early twentieth century China. Addressing both conceptual and institutional aspects of this process, it contextualizes the raising interest in the discipline among Qing scholars and Republican intellectuals. Arranged largely chronologically, it delineates the successive periods in the reception of major works of and intellectual trends in the field. It introduces the most influential scholars promoting a public discourse on logic in the final years of the empire, but also (...) the ever more professional agents who participated in the ensuing establishment of a modern institutional framework for studies in logic like universities, departments of logic, academic societies, journals etc. While at the beginning, these people were mostly no trained logicians, progress in the establishment of academic logic in the 1930s provided the conditions for the formation of the first Chinese specialists in the field who were often internationally trained and soon to engage in cutting-edge research. In some contrast, academic discourse on logic well into the 1930s was dominated by exaggerated social and political expectations, not least due to the successive influence on intellectuals of inductionist scientism in the first decades of the twentieth century, of an inflated pragmatist notion of logic in the 1920s, and of an overly simplistic “antiformalist” notion of logic propagated by (vulgar-)Marxist historical dialecticians in the 1930s. The arrival of scientific logic also went in tandem with a renewed interest in studies in the traditional Buddhist “science of reasons” (yinming, hetuvidyā, “Buddhist logic”) and spurred the search for contributions to the field of logic in the record of inherited Chinese literature, a development which soon led to the common acceptance of the existence of genuinely Chinese traditions of logic. It is eventually a peculiarity of the Chinese reception of logic that since around 1920, less than two decades after the first modern translations of textbooks on traditional syllogistics, the visit of Bertrand Russell – one of the fathers of mathematical logic – fueled the spread of this new approach to logic which has eventually changed its face for good. Designed as a historical survey, this chapter is a general account on the major contributions to the field by Chinese scholars of the time and has to forego detailed discussions. (shrink)

In the history of Indian Buddhism there existed scholars, who engaged in studying logic and epistemology, and this tradition still survives e.g. in Tibet. This field of study was traditionally called “the study of the logical reason” (hetuvidyā), and this school was named “die logische und erkenntnistheoretische Schule des Buddhismus” (the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition) by Prof. Erich Frauwallner. These scholars actually developed full-blown theories of logic and epistemology and were actively involved in discussions with Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist (...) philosophers. Nowadays the research of this school forms one of the major fields in the Indian Philosophy and Buddhist studies. However, it is still controversial among the modern scholars, as was the case with the historicalteachers in India and Tibet, whether this study of logic or epistemology is of any relevance for the Buddhist striving for liberation (nirvāna). In this presentation I would like to focus on discussing the status of scriptural authority in this tradition, and especially the interpretations of one statement by Dignāga (ca. 400-480), who is regarded as founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, will be re-examined. (shrink)