Boyer & Lienard's (B&L's) model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) rituals does not completely conform to our clinical experience with patients, and the clinical implications of their model is not described by the authors. We discuss potential differences of opinion regarding both the nature of OCD and the mechanisms involved in the maintenance of symptoms, and how emotional processing theories can account for treatment effects. (Published Online February 8 2007).
An examination of the contemporary Italian movement associated with M. P. Sciacca, and the serious application of dialectical and phenomenological methods to unveil the structure of "intentionality" or "spirit." An appraisal of Sciacca together with a sample critique of Dante follows a competent summary of the prevailing positions.--D. B. B.
Summary: Some of the most authoritative names from the constructivist community have been called on to contribute to this volume, coherent with the editors' choice to start from a broad definition of psychological constructivism, and to maintain its various expressions and derivations... It seems clear that the editors strongly recommended the authors to include many examples and clinical cases to demonstrate with actual facts the applicability of the epistemological assumptions of constructivism to clinical practice. In my opinion, in addition to (...) reaching this target, this work provides numerous suggestions to those clinicians already conscious of the efficacy of the therapeutic applications of constructivism. (shrink)
Henry David Thoreau’s legacy as a major figure in the American tradition seems assured. Though largely ignored in his own day, his book Walden is now considered an American classic, and the site of his cabin at Walden Pond is a regular pilgrimage destination for tourists. Yet less clear is how to characterize Thoreau and his contribution to American thought: Is he a naturalist? A literary figure? A social critic? A transcendentalist? Thoreau’s Importance for Philosophy makes the argument that Thoreau (...) should best be understood as a philosopher, though as part of the older tradition of philosophy as learning to live well, to care for one’s soul. In particular, the editors insist that the book Walden, which is taken .. (shrink)
For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should (...) regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics. (shrink)
As this century has found new temporalities to replace linearity, discontinuities have become commonplace. Discontinuity, if carried to a pervasive extreme, destroys linearity…There were two enormous factors, beyond the general cultural climate, that promoted composers' active pursuit of discontinuities. These influences did not cause so much as feed the dissatisfaction with linearity that many artists felt. But the impact has been profound. One factor contributing to the increase of discontinuity was the gradual absorption of music from totally different cultures, which (...) had evolved over the centuries with virtually no contact with Western ideas…Cross-cultural exchange in music will, of course, never destroy aesthetic boundaries, but music of non-Western cultures continues to show Western composers new ways to use and experience time. The second tremendous influence on twentieth-century musical discontinuity was technological rather than sociological: the invention of recording techniques. Recording has not only brought distant and ancient musics into the here and now, it has also made the home and the car environment just as viable for music listening as the concert hall. The removal of music from the ritualized behavior that surrounds concertgoing struck a blow to the internal ordering of the listening experience. Furthermore, radios, records, and, more recently, tapes allow the listener to enter and exit a composition at will. An overriding progression from beginning to end may or may not be in the music, but the listener is not captive to that completeness. We all spin the dial, and we are more immune to having missed part of the music than composers might like to think. Jonathan D. Kramer is an associate professor of music theory and composition and director of electronic music at the College-Conservatory of Music of the University of Cincinnati. The present essay is part of his book, Time and Meaning in Music. (shrink)
Modernism has been a celebration of the present. Why does it need a legacy ? Why should that which was born in the spirit of rebellion perpetuate itself as tomorrow’s past? Modernism has been profoundly reflective of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century cultural values. Is that not enough? It is not that modernism has forgotten the past—an art that rebels against its past must understand its adversary—but rather that it asks us not to forget the present. The revolt of modernism was (...) made possible, if not inevitable, by the rediscovery of the past. In earlier, eras, when the past was less readily accessible, artists worked for their present with little thought about their heritage. Renaissance composers, for example, generally knew little of music even two generations old; much medieval music theory and composition were based on misconceptions of Greek models. Yet by the nineteenth century, works from the past were available and understood. Virtually all composers agreed with Johannes Brahms, who reputedly said of Ludwig van Beethoven, “You have no idea how the likes of us feel when we hear the tramp of a giant like him behind us.” Historical consciousness had entered the arts, and artists were both threatened by competition with the past and seduced by the powerful idea that their works might outlive them. The Romantic artist became a genius speaking to posterity. Gustav Mahler was not the only Romanticist to pin his hopes on the future: “My time will yet come.” Small wonder that, once the future came to be, its artists rebelled against pronouncements from their past—the time rightfully belonged to them and no longer to Mahler’s generation. While many twentieth-century artists continued to create for their future, the most extreme modernists rejected not only their past but also the quest for immortality. They have written of their day and for their day. The real legacy of modernism is that it has no legacy. Jonathan D. Kramer is professor of music theory and composition at the College-Conservatory of Music at the University of Cincinnati and also program annotator and new music advisor of the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra. He is currently working on Time and the Meanings of Music . His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, “New Temporalities in Music,” appeared in Spring 1981. (shrink)
Résumé L’imaginaire est une catégorie plastique qui renvoie à des conceptions préscientifiques, aux fictions politiques et juridiques, aux croyances religieuses, aux stéréotypes ou préjugés, sans se confondre avec tous ces objets. Notion imprécise et fourre-tout, l’imaginaire serait inutile pour saisir avec rigueur les objets du monde : il relèverait du subjectif et de l’insaisissable. Pourtant, l’imaginaire a bien un contenu, des structures et dévoile une visée de la conscience. En se fondant sur les écrits de Castoriadis, et notamment la distinction (...) imaginaire instituant et imaginaire institué, on propose d’utiliser cette notion comme un outil méthodologique d’analyse du droit. L’imaginaire n’est d’ailleurs pas étranger à la théorie du droit, principalement américaine, et notamment au sein de l’Université de Yale. Elle recoupe les préoccupations du courant des Cultural Legal studies, où l’on retrouve des auteurs tels que Paul Kahn, David Nelken, Austin Sarat et Jonathan Simon, etc. Le droit constituant une représentation du réel, l’usage de l’imaginaire doit chercher à saisir les significations profondes des normes juridiques, leur de manière de structurer notre pensée et les luttes qu’elles engendrent pour imposer des vérités toujours renégociables. (shrink)
D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between universals and that his account can also be straightforwardly extended to irreducibly probabilistic laws of nature. For the most part, philosophers have neglected to scrutinize Armstrong’s account of probabilistic laws. This is surprising precisely because his own claims about probabilistic laws make it unclear just what he takes them to be. We offer three interpretations of what Armstrong-style probabilistic laws are, and argue that all three interpretations (...) are incompatible either with some feature of Armstrong’s broader metaphysics or with essential features of his account of laws (or both). (shrink)
Abstract. In the last decades, several rapprochements have been made between quantum physics and the Advaita Vedānta (AV) school of Hinduism. Theoretical issues such as the role of the observer in measurement and physical interconnectedness have been associated with tenets of AV, generating various critical responses. In this study, I propose to address this encounter in the light of recent works on philosophical implications of quantum physics by the physicist and philosopher of science Bernard d’Espagnat.
The neuroscientists Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg, in addition to defending an empirically fruitful model of mystical experiences, argue that such experiences constitute evidence for the existence of a transcendent reality, which they call "Absolute Unitary Being." D'Aquili and Newberg point out that mystical experiences carry with them a vivid sense of reality, and that they involve characteristic forms of brain activity, just like perceptions of objects in ordinary waking consciousness. Their argument for Absolute Unitary Being fails, however, since the (...) vivid sense of reality of an experience is not the sole criterion by which to judge its veridicality, since the object of mystical experiences cannot be confirmed by independent observers, and since there is no evidence for a mechanism by which mystics experience a transcendent reality. (shrink)
In this article I assess the coherence of Jonathan Edwards's doctrine of divine simplicity as an instance of an actus purus account of perfect-being theology. Edwards's view is an idiosyncratic version of this doctrine. This is due to a number of factors including his idealism and the Trinitarian context from which he developed his notion of simplicity. These complicating factors lead to a number of serious problems for his account, particularly with respect to the opera extra sunt indivisa principle. (...) I conclude that Edwards sets out an interesting and subtle version of the doctrine, but one which appears mired in difficulties from which he is unable to extract himself. (shrink)
Si l’exigence de cohérence, entendue comme non-contradiction, semble traverser les domaines et être entendue aussi bien dans le champ théorique que dans la pratique, il n’en demeure pas moins que le passage de l’un à l’autre peut induire des distorsions sur lesquelles nous trouvons, dans la pensée pratique et appliquée de Jonathan Glover, des indications précieuses. Cela amène à reconsidérer le concept de décision au regard de celui de ligne de conduite et à interroger les liens qu’entretient la personnalité (...) de l’agent moral avec les actions qui sont les siennes. Ce parcours critique prend son sens à travers la confrontation entre les exigences éthiques kantiennes et les questions de Tolstoï dans Anna Karénine, que nous envisagerons ici en tenant compte de l’absence de solution de continuité, du moins pour Jonathan Glover, entre philosophie et littérature. (shrink)
Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002) ignores an important aspect of the history of the concept: the determinism of Jonathan Edwards (1754) and the later response to this determinism by William James and others. We argue that Edwards's formulation, and James's resolution of the resulting dilemma, are superior to Wegner's.