1.  89
    Risk aversion in expected intertemporal discounted utilities bandit problems.Jean-Philippe Chancelier, Michel De Lara & André de Palma - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (4):433-440.
    We consider a situation where an individual is facing an uncertain situation, but may costly alter his knowledge of the uncertainties. We study in this context how risk aversion may modify the individual search behavior. We consider a one-armed bandit problem (where one arm is safe and the other is risky) and study how the agent risk aversion can change the sequence of arms selected. The main result is that when the utility function is more concave, the agent has more (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
  2.  46
    Parametric multi-attribute utility functions for optimal profit under risk constraints.Babacar Seck, Laetitia Andrieu & Michel De Lara - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (2):257-271.
    We provide an economic interpretation of the practice consisting in incorporating risk measures as constraints in an expected prospect maximization problem. For what we call the infimum of expectations class of risk measures, we show that if the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expectation of a random prospect under constraint that the risk measure is bounded above, he then behaves as a “generalized expected utility maximizer” in the following sense. The DM exhibits ambiguity with respect to a family of utility (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
  3.  1
    Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments.Vincent Martinet, Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara - forthcoming - Theory and Decision:1-30.
    Applying the solutions defined in the axiomatic bargaining theory to actual bargaining problems is a challenge when the problem is not described by its Utility Possibility Set (UPS) but as a social choice environment specifying the set of alternatives and utility profile underlying the UPS. It requires computing the UPS, which is an operational challenge, and then identifying at least one alternative that actually achieves the bargained solution’s outcome. We introduce the axioms of Independence of Non-Strongly-Efficient Alternatives (resp. Weakly) and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation