Although often cast by realists as an exemplar of moralist or rationalist thinking, Jürgen Habermas and certain commentators on his work reject this characterisation, highlighting elements of his thought that conflict with it. This article will examine dimensions of Habermas’s work that relate to many realist concerns in political theory. I argue that while he escapes the commonplace caricature of an abstract thinker who is inattentive to real world affairs, Habermas’s claims in relation to communication, historical and empirical context, and (...) the development of rights in history, reveal a narrow consideration of what defines context and a progressivist narrative of history that fails to address seemingly outdated beliefs and political forces. An analysis of these issues can serve to inform understandings of these topics in realist thought and in political theory more broadly. (shrink)

In recent realist theory and more broadly, pessimism has tended to be treated as a problem or a liability for thought, limiting aspirations for political change and leading towards conservatism. In this article, I turn to Niccolò Machiavelli as a resource through which to theorize differently about the idea. I argue that pessimism in Machiavelli’s work can be associated with an effort to look candidly upon political affairs and to express scepticism towards complacency in thought and conduct. Such an approach, (...) rather than tending towards despair or cynicism, can be seen to make different dimensions of history and politics visible and to open up different paths of judgment and decision-making as a result. Rather than constraining thought and action, pessimism in Machiavelli’s thinking can therefore reveal novel possibilities for political conduct. (shrink)

This article is a comparative theoretical study of authority in the Arab Spring which draws upon the work of Max Weber and Khalil Ahmad Khalil, and examines the theoretical importance of a shift away from authority understood along the lines of single, charismatic individuals. I argue that the central implication of the lack of dominant leaders in the Arab Spring is the potential for the growth of a popular form of charismatic authority. This popular understanding of charisma would have several (...) important consequences for building a more broadly inclusive arrangement of democratic rule. First, it would allow for the self-realization of ordinary citizens in a way that was not possible in an authoritarian setting, where popular aspirations and demands were realized only abstractly, if not simply denied, by being invested in the figure of an ‘inspirational leader.’ This self-realization relies upon an important reversal of an image of Arab publics as incapable of self-governance. Second, it would signal a shi... (shrink)