Contrasting accounts of physicalism and strong emergentism face two problems. According to the neutrality problem, contrasting supervenience-based formulations of these positions cannot be neutral with respect to certain unrelated metaphysical commitments. According to the collapse problem, emergent properties can be accounted for using an appropriately expansive physical ontology, rendering strong emergentism metaphysically suspect. I argue that both these problems can be solved with a principled distinction between emergent causal laws and physical laws. I propose such a distinction based on a (...) finite discontinuity in the behavior of fundamental physical constituents as a function of complexity. (shrink)

In classical modal semantics, a binary accessibility relation connects worlds. In this paper, we present a uniform and systematic treatment of modal semantics with a continuous accessibility relation alongside the continuous accessibility modal logics that they model. We develop several such logics for a variety of philosophical applications. Our main conclusions are as follows. Modal logics with a continuous accessibility relation are sound and complete in their natural classes of models. The class of Kripke frames where a continuous accessibility relation (...) has a magnitude characterizing its degree of accessibility is not modally definable, and this has unappreciated significance to completeness proofs for such logics, revealing a methodological advantage of using classical multimodal semantics over fuzzy modal semantics. There is a pseudometric space modal logic that is complete in the class of pseudometric spaces, a natural semantic setting for quantitative modal reasoning about similarity. There is a metric space modal logic that is complete in the class of metric spaces, a natural semantic setting for quantitative modal reasoning about neighborhoods and counterfactual stability. There is a real line continuous temporal logic that is canonical for real lines, a natural semantic setting for quantitative modal reasoning about time. (shrink)

According to the Multiple Realizability Argument, a higher-level property typically has many physical realizers, so it cannot be type-identical to any one of them. This enables the non-reductive physicalist to claim that some higher-level properties are type-distinct from physical properties. The reductive physicalist can counter with the Disjunctive Strategy: nothing prevents us from type-identifying the higher-level property with the disjunction of its realizers. Developing a powers-based ontology of properties, Shoemaker and Wilson present responses to the Disjunctive Strategy, wherein higher-level property (...) instances are token-distinct from their realizers, while instances of disjunctions are not. In this paper, I argue that such responses to the Disjunctive Strategy can be reasonably resisted, either by denying token-distinctness, or by insisting that exhaustively overlapping disjunctive properties are also token-distinct from the realizers. This secures the Disjunctive Strategy as a core component of the argument for reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Individuals are often the subject of generalizations of various special sciences. The traditional argument is that there can't be laws about such individuals, since the law statements would have to contain local predicates. Marc Lange argues that, despite local predication, there can be laws about individuals. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there can be no such laws – not because of local predication, but because the laws would discriminate among material systems on non-qualitative grounds. I rely on the (...) principle that qualitatively identical systems under one set of laws must evolve in the same manner. If there could be laws about individuals, nothing would guarantee that the principle is satisfied. My argument is illustrated by a thought experiment inspired by Strawson's massive reduplication argument. (shrink)