The philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger is a milestone in the 20th century philosophy. On the one hand, Husserl preserved the notions of subject and consciousness, avoiding naïve misconceptions of these notions and clearing new paths for philosophical investigation. On the other hand, Heidegger, departing from a criticai dialogue with Husserl’s phenomenology, challenged key presuppositions of modern philosophy by investigating the social and pragmatic dimension ofkllowledge and intentionality.

The article attempts to articulate Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic views of knowledge, language and understanding. Wittgenstein is not a member of the so-called hermeneutic tradition, but his late work has important affinities with the work of hermeneutic thinkers like Heidegger and Gadamer. Firstly, Wittgenstein and hermeneutics share a basic philosophical altitude that can be termed as “phenomenology of everydayness”. An important result of such an approach is the acknowledgement of the pragmatic and social dimension of knowledge. Secondly, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Gadamer (...) reject formal or systematic theories of meaning and claim that language is the universal medium of human experience. Thirdly, they conceive of understanding as a practical ability. Wittgenstein helps us to clarify some hermeneutic themes and develops them from an antimetaphysical standpoint. On the other hand, hermeneutics can refine some aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought; a case in point is the Gadamerian doctrine of the fusion of horizons, which avoids the danger of relativism that lurks in Wittgenstein’s late work. A comparative study of Wittgenstein and hermeneutics contributes therefore to effective philosophical progress. (shrink)