The main objective of this article is to demonstrate why despite the growing interest in justifying AI’s trustworthiness, one can argue for AI’s reliability. By analyzing why trustworthiness ethics in Nickel’s sense provides some wellgrounded hints for rethinking the rational, affective and normative accounts of trust in respect to AI, I examine some concerns about the trustworthiness of Savulescu and Maslen’s model of moral AI as an adviser. Specifically, I tackle one of its exemplifications regarding Klincewicz’s hypothetical scenario of John (...) which is refracted through the lens of the HLEG’s fifth requirement of trustworthy artificial intelligence (TAI), namely, that of Diversity, non-discrimination and fairness. (shrink)

Seth Vannatta’s book Conservatism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics, and Ethics is a thought-provoking inquiry challenging the reader to go beyond the clichés imposed by contemporary American everyday discourse, namely, to overcome associating conservatism with right wing politics, and pragmatism with the formula that practice determines what should work best in politics. He sets the ambitious goal of demonstrating how comparing rather than contrasting the visions of classical British conservative thought and classical American pragmatist philosophy contributes to revealing the complex (...) genealogy of a normative methodology that can be applied in many disciplines. The normative methodology can question the universal.. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to analyze the reasons behind Thomas Ligotti’s recognition of Peter Wessel Zapffe as an anti-natalist. Specifically, I argue that Ligotti’s focus on Zapffe’s early essay The Last Messiah (1933) alone results in some misunderstandings of Zapffe’s views, which make room for coining him an antinatalist. These misunderstandings ground associated dichotomies of the type, Ligotti’s misinterpretation versus Zapffe’s theory, such as the dichotomy of self-deception versus heterotelic metaphysical activity of phantasy, as embedded in that (...) of illusions versus fixations, and the dichotomy tragedy versus necessary tragic. Comparing and contrasting Ligotti’s analysis of three examples of Zapffe’s works including The Last Messiah and Fragments of an Interview (1959), as well as choosing one more example – that of Zapffe’s monograph On the Tragic (1941) – I aim to demonstrate why reducing Zapffe’s ideas of the necessary tragic and multifrontal conflicts to anti-natalism per se simplifies the unique philosophical background in which these ideas occur. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate why AI researchers’ attempts at developing projects of moral machines are a cause for concern regarding the way in which such machines can reach a certain level of morality. By comparing and contrasting Howard and Muntean’s model of a virtuous Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent and Bauer’s model of a two-level utilitarian Artificial Moral Agent, I draw the conclusion that both models raise, although in a different manner, some crucial issues. The latter (...) are recognized as deriving from the complex relationships between human cognition and moral reasoning, as refracted through the lens of the idea of moral AI. In this context, special attention is paid to the complications which are triggered by the analogical thinking regarding the processes of replication of human morality in the field of machine ethics. (shrink)

The article discusses the genealogy of 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies as deriving from a specific philosophy of climbing, one which is irreducible to philosophy of alpinism so far as it is based on the principle of cooperation and on the intrinsic value of interacting with the mountain rather than on competition, which makes the mountain an arena for sport activities. In this context, the expression to think like a mountain will be analyzed as something more than an impressive metaphor, and examined (...) as a new way of thinking that avoids the extremes of both radical anthropocentrism and biocentrism. (shrink)