This collection of essays by the well-known Aristotle and Aquinas scholar, presented to him at the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, forms a good overview of his broad scholarship. The two volumes, entitled The Commentaries on Aristotle: The Metaphysics of Being and Moral Action. Theological Approaches, contain twenty-two articles of which fourteen are written in French, six in English, one in German, and one in Spanish.

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analyticsynthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio exprincipiis. But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

It is argued that John Bickle's Ruthless Reductionism is flawed as an account of the practice of neuroscience. Examples from genetics and linguistics suggest, first, that not every mind-brain link or gene-phenotype link qualifies as a reduction or as a complete explanation, and, second, that the higher (psychological) level of analysis is not likely to disappear as neuroscience progresses. The most plausible picture of the evolving sciences of the mind-brain seems a patchwork of multiple connections and partial explanations, linking anatomy, (...) mechanisms and functions across different domains, levels, and grain sizes. Bickle's claim that only the molecular level provides genuine explanations, and higher level concepts are just heuristics that will soon be redundant, is thus rejected. In addition, it is argued that Bickle's recasting of philosophy of science as metascience explicating empirical practices, ignores an essential role for philosophy in reflecting upon criteria for reduction and explanation. Many interesting and complex issues remain to be investigated for the philosophy of science, and in particular the nature of interlevel links found in empirical research requires sophisticated philosophical analysis. (shrink)

In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view (...) of actual scientific practice. In response I contend that, on the contrary, a closer look at the memory reconsolidation following reactivation experiments and data suggests (1) a less revolutionary judgment about the proposed alternative, and (2) a now-complete reliance on ruthlessly reductive experimental methods from cellular and molecular neuroscience. These conclusions save the heuristic status I propose for higher-level investigations of behavior and brain. I close with a brief comment on their further charge that I 'sell out' philosophy of science to factual developments in science itself. (shrink)

Young Hegelianism has often been identified as a crucial element in the reorientation of Western philosophy during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to its substantial contribution to the ‘revolutionary rupture’ between Hegel and Nietzsche, it is even said to have had a direct and lasting influence on the identity of philosophy today. This article attempts to shed a new light on the Young Hegelians’ radical critique of traditional philosophy by focusing on their existential condition as youngphilosophers. More particularly, it attempts to (...) see their revolutionary philosophical project from the perspective of a generation conflict. In order to underline the validity of this perspective, three specific arguments are elaborated and brought together. The first draws attention to the fact that the emergence of an independent youth generation was a totally new phenomenon in European civilization at that time. By demonstrating its intrinsic relationship with rebellious youth movements such as Young Italy, Young Europe and Young Germany, Young Hegelianism is situated in the social and political context of a wide-ranginggeneration conflict in European culture. The second argument establishes that the name ‘Jung-Hegelianer’ was anything but an external or superficial indication since, by the end of the 1830ies, it became the consciously preferred self-identification of the radical fraction within the Hegelian school. Hence, the use of the prefix ‘young’ should be associated with the then prevailing subversive meaning of the term, expressing the belief in a whole-sale cultural renewal by the young generation. The third and final argument reveals how the philosophical revolution of the Young Hegelians is fundamentally linked with Hegel’s dialectical understanding of the different stages of life. In that respect, their name also expresses a well-considered philosophical choice for the stage of youth and accordingly determines a specific way of philosophizing. (shrink)

According to the grammar of Port-Royal it is possible to convert the noun ‘homme’ into the adjective 'humain' by adding a confused signification or connotation. Strangely enough it is stipulated that by the reversal of this process the adjective 'human' is converted into the substantive ‘humanité’ rather than the original noun ‘homme’. In this article I argue that the treatment of adjectives and substantives in the Port-Royal grammar depends strongly on the traditional Aristotelian ontology as summarized in the so-called ontological (...) square and the theory of the predicables. In connection with this it is shown that according to the Port-Royalists corresponding concrete and abstract nouns like ‘homme’ and ‘humanité’, should be in some sense equivalent. (shrink)

Het idee van de vooruitgang is jong, gezien in het licht van de menselijke beschaving. De oude Griekse mythologie schilderde een cyclische neergang, steeds slechtere tijden wisselden elkaar af, tot uit de absolute neergang weer iets nieuw zou ontstaan, de joodse visie was lineair, er was een steeds grotere neergang tot de Messias een nieuw tijdperk zou inluiden. De moderne idee van vooruitgang heeft twee hoofdstromingen, de voortuitgang van de techniek en de vervolmaakbaarheid van de mens, met universele democratie (...) als einddoel. De middelen om dit doel te bereiken zijn nog niet gevonden. (shrink)

Een poging om de geschiedenis van een denkwijze door de eeuwen heen, in dit geval die van het schema van “het midden- en middellijkheidsdenken” , resp. het “denken in termen van ‘midden’ en ‘bemiddeling’” , kritisch in kaart te brengen valt op het eerste gezicht onder het genre Ideengeschichte of history of ideas. Zeker wanneer men ideeëngeschiedenis enerzijds enger, maar anderzijds daarbinnen weer breder opvat dan de invulling die Arthur Lovejoy daaraan gaf in zijn bekende The Great Chain of Being (...) .Het enerzijds betreft de inperking tot het terrein van de filosofie. Het anderzijds raakt hetgeen als idea wordt geaccepteerd. Lovejoy spreekt over ideeën vaak als “unit ideas” en vergt dat deze eenvoudig en ook enkelvoudig zijn. Ik zou in de ideeëngeschiedenis ook ruimte willen maken voor meer complexe filosofische noties, schema’s en zelfs filosofische theorieën. Wel lijkt me dat moet worden vastgehouden aan de eis dat deze ideeën naspeurbaar zijn door filosofische stromingen heen en dat zij bij voorkeur een zekere breedheid vertonen, ook in de zin van toepassing blijken te vinden in meerdere deelgebieden van de filosofie. En hier zij alvast maar genoteerd dat ook Van der Hoeven Lovejoy en diens studie noemt. (shrink)

Kant's Notion of "Transcendental Truth". [English] The aim of this work is to elucidate the notion of “transcendental truth” and to show its role in the Kantian system. I will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to (...) establish the truth of a priori knowledge and delimitate the field of empirical truth. [Español] El objetivo de este trabajo es dilucidar la noción de “verdad trascendental” y mostrar su lugar en el sistema kantiano. Se defenderá que la verdad trascendental consiste, en línea con la definición tradicional de verdad, en un sentido de correspondencia entre conocimiento y objeto, que la lógica trascendental establece criterios de verdad trascendental, y que es esta noción de verdad la que permite establecer la verdad del conocimiento a priori y delimitar el territorio de la verdad empírica. (shrink)