En este trabajo hablamos de la posibilidad de una psicología fenomenológica,no como oportunidad de refundición del proyecto husserliano, sino comoplan de revisión de los fundamentos de una psicología de confección naturalista a partir de un tratamiento estrictamente fenomenológico. Esta revisión crítica, operada por Husserl, dialogará muy de cerca con las tesis que W. Dilthey desenvuelve en 1894, bajo el signo de una psicología descriptiva. Es nuestra intención mostrar, una vez ponderadas las insuficiencias evidenciadas por la perspectiva diltheyniana, la utilidad incuestionable (...) de la psicología fenomenológica como plataforma y vía de acceso indirecto para una auténtica filosofía fenomenológica.In this paper, we address the possibility of a phenomenological psychology,not having in mind a re-establishment of the husserlian project, but as plan torevise, from a strictly phenomenological approach, the basis of a naturalistic psychology. Such a critical revise, operated by Husserl, will dialogue closely with the thesis developed by W. Dilthey in 1894, under the title of a descriptive psychology. It´s our purpose to explain, given the insufficiency shown by Dilthey’s own perspective, the unquestionable utility of this phenomenological psychology as groundwork and indirect access way to a genuine phenomenological philosophy. (shrink)

Considering the problem of a supposed hidden psychology as the question which, in practice, shows the true face of Husserlian phenomenology is to put, from the very beginning, the relation between psychology and phenomenology in a misguided way. In fact, what is to be considered is the decisive influence psychology has in the route systematically followed by the discipline created by E. Husserl, and whether or not such influence can meet its latter transcendental dimension.

In this paper, we want to address the Merieau Ponty’s thesis which states that occidentai philosophical tradition mistreats sensibiiity. It’s not as we had some kind of substantial doubt regarding this statement which is, in fact, historically and philosophically accurate. However, what is not clear enough is the reason for disregarding the notable effort developed by Kant to restore its value and importance. Thus, we will first attend Kant’s sensibility doctrine which underlies both knowledge and taste, and concentrate subsequently on (...) the reasons for the diagnosis of its insufficiency, according to the principles established by Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical perspective. A final question regarding the distinction between a “Sensitive Reason” and a so called “Aesthetic Reason” will guide the reader trough the central assumptions that lie behind this critical assessment expounded by Merleau-Ponty’s new ontology. (shrink)

In this paper, we will consider the following issue: the innovative dimension of E. Husserl’s phenomenology repeatedly finds in the philosophies of Descartes and Kant a clear obstacle for its full comprehension. After all, is it not the case that the former discipline is just an extension of the perspectives stated by those earlier philosophers? But, to state the idea of a hidden phenomenology in the philosophies of Descartes and Kant has not, as its unavoidable counterpart, the dependence and the (...) full commitment of Husserl ‘s phenomenology with positive doctrines as the one sponsored by Descartes and Kant? And, if so, how can we rescue the idea of phenomenology as prima philosophia? (shrink)

One of the most significant marks of this article is the attempt to establish the idea that a new phenomenological approach is needed for the study consciousness and all it’s features. The point is that the old demand for a scientific approach to consciousness shouldn’t be, as it has been, incompatible with de need to preserve the essential nature of consciousness. Unfortunately, that’s precisely the case in the majority of the proposals related with the study of consciousness. The debate with (...) Fodor is thus quite important, since it brings to light precisely what one must avoid in order to save every single difficulty related with consciousness, and consciousness itself. A new methodology is therefore needed, one that is capable to observe the demands just acknowledged, but one that is capable to point new directions as well. Husserl, as we have seen, has much to say on the subject, but there is yet much to be done. (shrink)