The public interest statement contained in the PRSA Code of Professional Standards is unduly vague and provides neither a working definition of public interest nor any guidance for the performance of what most professions consider to be a primary value. This paper addresses the question of what might constitute public relations service in the public interest, and calls for more stringent guidelines to be developed whereby the profession may advance its service goals more clearly.

Recent discussions of the Axial Age in Greece (R. Bellah, 2011; K. Raaflaub, 2005) detailed some of the distinctive features of Greek religious life that allowed for the eventual development of a more secular outlook. In contrast to the religion of the ancient Israelites with its strong emphasis on the providential nature of human history, Greek religion evolved as a traditional set of ritual practices and cults that allowed humankind to maintain the goodwill of the gods. However, divine favor was (...) no substitute for human effort as the Greeks did not regard the gods as the architects of their fate. Human beings were ultimately seen as responsible for their own individual fates with bad outcomes attributed to misfortune or personal character defects. Positive outcomes in everyday life were ultimately the result of individual or collective effort. This attitude is reflected in the text of Hesiod, who dates from the outset of the Axial era. Hesiod stated that the gods have created a world that provides everything we need for prosperity, but that they were also spiteful in that they required mankind to work hard to take advantage of it. This religious outlook led to the development of a Weberian worldly asceticism among individual Greeks which allowed for the economic rationalization that transformed Greece into a more competitive society in which social mobility was possible and poverty scorned. The growth in the size of the rural middle class made the political life of the polis more participatory, thus laying the basis for the competitive political and intellectual climate of Axial Age Greece. (shrink)

There are grounds for taking Plato's agenda of searching for definitions to be ironic, and he points toward good arguments for being wary of trust in definitions.

The purpose of this essay is to isolate and examine the complex, sometimes paradoxical, ethical perspectives of I. F. Stone, the life-long radical journalist who was also a determined press critic. Drawing on a close reading of Stone 's work, secondary sources, interviews in numerous publications, and conversations held shortly before his death, the essay organizes and discusses four primary ethical concerns in Stone 's writings: the pursuit of news, power, profit, and freedom of expression. After situating Stone 's ethics (...) within a broader context of ethical theory, the essay considers limitations of Stone 's approach, which lead, finally, to a larger discussion of the most appropriate sites for media studies and ethical criticism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Gorgias presents us with a mystery and an enigma: Who was Callicles? And, what was Plato trying to accomplish in this dialogue? While searching for the identity of Callicles, we gain a better understanding of Plato's purpose for this dialogue, which is to use justice as a means for staking out the boundaries of four types of rhetoric. This article argues that Plato uses the Gorgias to reveal the deficiencies of sophistic nomos-centered rhetorics and an unjust sophistic phusis-centered (...) rhetoric, opening the door for a “true” rhetoric that he articulates in the Phaedrus and a universal justice based on virtue that he describes in the Republic. (shrink)

Two excerpts from Xenophon, in which he states that Socrates avidly practised religious ceremonies promoted by Athens, are subject to two different interpretations by modern historians. For some, they are the proof that the Athenian city was only concerned with the rituals of its fellow citizens, and in no way with their beliefs. In contrast with this view, Hendrick Versnel feels that, by writing that Socrates performed ceremonies, Xenophon thinks that he proves that his master really did believe in the (...) gods. Both of these interpretations are incorrect, as a careful new consideration of these passages can demonstrate. (shrink)

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to (...) learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned. (shrink)

A concept of critical thinking is developed based on the Socratic method and called accordingly a Socratic model. First the features of critical thinking stressed in this model are stated and illustrated. The Socratic method is presented and interpreted, then taken to yield a model of critical thinking. The process of internalization by which the Socratic model helps us to become critical thinkers is described. Argument analysis is considered as a widely used instructional strategy adaptable for teaching critical thinking on (...) the Socratic model. This Socratic model is advanced as one helpful way of organizing our ideas about critical thinking, helpful in unifying disparate factors and anchoring them in the humanist tradition. (shrink)

Professor Vlastos argues that Socratic irony was responsible for a momentous change in the way in which irony was understood in ancient times. Before Socrates, he argues, irony is connected with lying and deceit, but after Socrates it is associated with wit and urbanity. Vlastos claims that Socratic irony is distinctive and complex. According to Vlastos, Socratic irony involves no hint of deception; it consists simply in saying something which when understood in one way is false, but when understood in (...) another way is true. (shrink)

Professor Vlastos argues that Socratic irony was responsible for a momentous change in the way in which irony was understood in ancient times. Before Socrates, he argues, irony is connected with lying and deceit, but after Socrates it is associated with wit and urbanity. Vlastos claims that Socratic irony is distinctive and complex. According to Vlastos, Socratic irony involves no hint of deception; it consists simply in saying something which when understood in one way is false, but when understood in (...) another way is true. (shrink)

The master narrative of a profound crisis in traditional faith leading to a hardening of authority and religious persecution in late fifth-century Athens has a long scholarly history, one that maintains a persistent presence in current research. This paper proposes to reexamine some aspects of religious authority in late fifth-century Athens through one case-study: the trial of Andocides in 400 BCE. Instead of proposing a new reconstruction of the events that led to this trial, it will compare and contrast the (...) rival rhetorics of authority deployed by Andocides in De mysteriis and Ps.-Lysias in In Andocidem and attempt to locate them in their respective social and cultural contexts. (shrink)