We show that the 0-1 law does not hold for the class Σ 1 1 (∀∃∀ without =) by finding a sentence in this class which almost surely expresses parity. We also show that every recursive real in the unit interval is the asymptotic probability of a sentence in this class. This expands a result by Lidia Tendera, who in 1994 proved that every rational number in the unit interval is the asymptotic probability of a sentence in the class Σ (...) 1 1 ∀∃∀ with equality. (shrink)

In a 1969 paper, Quine coined the term 'limits of decision'. This term evidently refers to limits on the logical vocabulary of a logic, beyond which satisfiability is no longer decidable. In the same paper. Quine showed that not only monadic formulas, but homogeneous k-adic formulas for arbitrary k lie on the decidable side of the limits of decision. But the precise location of the limits of decision has remained an open question. The present paper answers that question. It addresses (...) the question of decidability of those sublogics of first-order logic that are defined in terms of their logical vocabularies. A complete answer is obtained, thus locating exactly Quine's limits of decision. (shrink)

As is well-known, the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey class of all prenex ∃*∀* -sentences which are valid in classical first-order logic is decidable. This paper paves the way to an analogous result which the authors deem to hold when the only available predicate symbols are ∈ and =, no constants or function symbols are present, and one moves inside a (rather generic) Set Theory whose axioms yield the well-foundedness of membership and the existence of infinite sets. Here semi-decidability of the satisfiability problem for (...) the BSR class is proved by following a purely semantic approach, the remaining part of the decidability result being postponed to a forthcoming paper. (shrink)

The problem is addressed of establishing the satisfiability of prenex formulas involving a single universal quantifier, in diversified axiomatic set theories. A rather general decision method for solving this problem is illustrated through the treatment of membership theories of increasing strength, ending with a subtheory of Zermelo-Fraenkel which is already complete with respect to the ∀*∀ class of sentences. NP-hardness and NP-completeness results concerning the problems under study are achieved and a technique for restricting the universal quantifier is presented.

We propose an original use of techniques from random graph theory to find a Monadic ∑ 1 1 sentence without an asymptotic probability. Our result implies that the 0-1 law fails for the logics ∑ 1 1 and ∑ 1 1 . Therefore we complete the classification of first-order prefix classes with or without equality, according to the existence of the 0-1 law for the corresponding ∑ 1 1 fragment. In addition, our counterexample can be viewed as a single explanation (...) of the failure of the 0-1 law of all the fragments of existential second-order logic for which the failure is already known. (shrink)

Set theory is an autonomous and sophisticated field of mathematics, enormously successful not only at its continuing development of its historical heritage but also at analyzing mathematical propositions cast in set-theoretic terms and gauging their consistency strength. But set theory is also distinguished by having begun intertwined with pronounced metaphysical attitudes, and these have even been regarded as crucial by some of its great developers. This has encouraged the exaggeration of crises in foundations and of metaphysical doctrines in general. However, (...) set theory has proceeded in the opposite direction, from a web of intensions to a theory of extensionpar excellence, and like other fields of mathematics its vitality and progress have depended on a steadily growing core of mathematical structures and methods, problems and results. There is also the stronger contention that from the beginning set theory actually developed through a progression ofmathematicalmoves, whatever and sometimes in spite of what has been claimed on its behalf.What follows is an account of the development of set theory from its beginnings through the creation of forcing based on these contentions, with an avowedly Whiggish emphasis on the heritage that has been retained and developed by current set theory. The whole transfinite landscape can be viewed as the result of Cantor's attempt to articulate and solve the Continuum Problem. (shrink)

Motivated by problems that arise in computing degrees of belief, we consider the problem of computing asymptotic conditional probabilities for first-order sentences. Given first-order sentences φ and θ, we consider the structures with domain {1,..., N} that satisfy θ, and compute the fraction of them in which φ is true. We then consider what happens to this fraction as N gets large. This extends the work on 0-1 laws that considers the limiting probability of first-order sentences, by considering asymptotic conditional (...) probabilities. As shown by Liogon'kii [24], if there is a non-unary predicate symbol in the vocabulary, asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist. We extend this result to show that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist for any reasonable notion of limit. Liogon'kii also showed that the problem of deciding whether the limit exists is undecidable. We analyze the complexity of three problems with respect to this limit: deciding whether it is well-defined, whether it exists, and whether it lies in some nontrivial interval. Matching upper and lower bounds are given for all three problems, showing them to be highly undecidable. (shrink)

We identify the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for FO 2 , the fragment of first-order logic consisting of all relational first-order sentences with at most two distinct variables. Although this fragment was shown to be decidable a long time ago, the computational complexity of its decision problem has not been pinpointed so far. In 1975 Mortimer proved that FO 2 has the finite-model property, which means that if an FO 2 -sentence is satisfiable, then it has a finite (...) model. Moreover, Mortimer showed that every satisfiable FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most doubly exponential in the size of the sentence. In this paper, we improve Mortimer's bound by one exponential and show that every satisfiable FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of the sentence. As a consequence, we establish that the satisfiability problem for FO 2 is NEXPTIME-complete. (shrink)