While legal rights to make medical treatment decisions at the end of one's life have been recognized by the courts, particular religious traditions put axiological and metaphysical meat on the bare bones of legal rights. Mere legal rights do not capture the full reality, meaning and importance of death. End-of-life decisions reflect not only the meaning we find in dying, but also the meaning we have found in living. The Christian religions bring particular understandings of the vision of life as (...) a gift from God, human responsibility for stewardship of that life, the wholeness of the person, and the importance of the dying process in preparing spiritually for life beyond earthly life, to bear on end-of-life decisions. (shrink)

In ethics, ‘probabilism’ refers to a position defended by a number of Catholic theologians, mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They held that, when one is uncertain which of a range of actions is the right one to perform, it is permissible to perform any which has a good chance of being the right one—even if there is another which has a better chance. This paper considers the value of this position from the viewpoint of modern ethical philosophy. The (...) unusual nature of probabilism as a theory focusing upon permissibility, rather than right-making properties, is explored and related to some modern attempts to set out ‘satisficing’ and ‘hybrid’ ethical theories. Such theories try to distinguish between what is best and what is permissible, and probabilism can be understood as an alternative way of supplementing a theory of right-making properties by adding to it a theory of permissibility. But a more radical version is also possible, where one abandons any attempt to identify right actions or right-making properties, and instead considers permissibility alone. Accordingly, a ‘multi-account theory’ of permissibility is proposed and defended as a model of how many people actually make moral decisions. (shrink)

This review essay discusses the significance of Charles Curran's contribution to the field of Catholic theological ethics. I suggest that Curran's theological voice is a distinct and important one, that his preoccupations mirror major concerns in moral theology, and that his approach has been shaped through his long-standing ecumenical and interdisciplinary commitments. I consider four recent monographs and analyze Curran's impact under the headings of (1) the nature of moral theology; (2) the ecclesial shape of moral theology; (3) the (historical) (...) contexts of moral theology; and (4) the (social) character of moral theology. I note that Curran's primary concern has been to honor the richness of the Catholic moral tradition, and that the range and depth of his work is unrivalled in contemporary Catholic moral theology. I conclude by suggesting that Curran's contribution to the discipline of moral theology has been both formative and transformative. (shrink)

This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians’ rights to conscience versus patients’ rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is a necessary component of the moral life in general and (...) a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency. It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations, makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry, idiosyncrasy, and personal bias. (shrink)