Three fallacies

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666 (2000)
Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X00223431
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