Hilary Putnam's View on Relativism in Context of Truth and Rationality

Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review 6 (2):65-84 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Relativism has been discussed concerning the concepts of truth and rationality in Hilary Putnam's thoughts. Putnam suggested that truth is formed by idealizing rational acceptability. Rational acceptability is a criterion that depends on cognitive virtues and can change with human development. The relation of the sciences to the concept of conformity shows that our knowledge of the world presupposes values. Putnam considers relativism an inconsistent view in the sense that justification for truth is up to the individual. He says that at least some value judgments should be objective. He argues that some conceptual truths are not descriptions of reality, but are indisputably true. Here, he thinks that we have objectivity without an object.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,475

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding.Gordon Steinhoff - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.
Putnam and the Difficulty of Renouncing All Theory.Michael Hymers - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):55-82.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, languages and worlds.Panu Raatikainen - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (2):167–174.
Revisiting Rorty’s Notion of Truth.Rahul Kumar Maurya - 2021 - Contemporary Pragmatism 18 (4):459-465.
Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity.Anders Öberg - 2011 - Dissertation, Uppsala University

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-05

Downloads
14 (#981,381)

6 months
4 (#783,550)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references