Abstract

This chapter offers a description of what all classical and contemporary pragmatists have in common and in virtue of which we call them pragmatists. It also describes the ways in which classical and contemporary pragmatists differ on important epistemological issues, such as knowledge and truth. After then examining and rejecting longstanding criticisms of pragmatism, this chapter compares pragmatists on the questions of atheism, theism, and the status of religious sentiment without belief in the personal God of the omni‐predicates. Peirce offered an argument (he called it a Neglected Argument) for belief in God. William James felt strongly that religious belief was well worth taking seriously as a positive moral force in the world, but in the end he was quite reluctant to accept the personal God of the omni‐predicates. Unlike Bertrand Russell, however, he did not believe that all religion was harmful and basically irrational. Dewey was a hard‐core materialist and hence an unabashed atheist. In the end, it seems fair to say that with regard to the existence of the traditional personal God of the omni‐predicates, there is no uniquely clear and generally accepted position among pragmatists in general.