Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):394-396 (2002)
|Abstract||1. Primary-kind properties. Rosenkrantz does not see how a single primary-kind property can be had by x essentially and by y contingently (where x ≠ y). He offers a reductio ad absurdum of the view that a primary can be had accidentally or derivatively. The reductio has as a premise the following: “[S]omething has a primarykind property, F-ness, derivatively only if the primary-kind property of a nonderivative F, i.e., the property which determines what a nonderivative F most fundamentally is, is nonderivative F-ness (rather than F-ness).” However, this premise is simply a denial of my view|
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