On Bertrand's paradox

Analysis 70 (1):30-35 (2010)
The Principle of Indifference is a central element of the ‘classical’ conception of probability, but, for all its strong intuitive appeal, it is widely believed that it faces a devastating objection: the so-called (by Poincare´) ‘Bertrand paradoxes’ (in essence, cases in which the same probability question receives different answers). The puzzle has fascinated many since its discovery, and a series of clever solutions (followed promptly by equally clever rebuttals) have been proposed. However, despite the long-standing interest in this problem, an important assumption, necessary for its generation, has been overlooked. My aim in this paper is to identify this assumption. Since what it claims turns out to be prima facie problematic, I will urge that the burden of proof now shifts to the objectors to PI; they have to provide reasons why this assumption holds.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anp124
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References found in this work BETA
John Norton (2008). Ignorance and Indifference. Philosophy of Science 75 (1):45-68.
Antony Eagle (2005). Randomness Is Unpredictability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.

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Citations of this work BETA
Zalán Gyenis & Miklós Rédei (2015). Defusing Bertrand’s Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):349-373.

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