The Curve Fitting Problem: A Bayesian Approach

Philosophy of Science 63 (5):S264-S272 (1996)
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Abstract

In the curve fitting problem two conflicting desiderata, simplicity and goodness-of-fit, pull in opposite directions. To this problem, we propose a solution that strikes a balance between simplicity and goodness-of-fit. Using Bayes' theorem we argue that the notion of prior probability represents a measurement of simplicity of a theory, whereas the notion of likelihood represents the theory's goodness-of-fit. We justify the use of prior probability and show how to calculate the likelihood of a family of curves. We diagnose the relationship between simplicity of a theory and its predictive accuracy.

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Citations of this work

Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
The role of Bayesian philosophy within Bayesian model selection.Jan Sprenger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.

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