Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed

Noûs 44 (4):601-627 (2010)
In this paper I develop a framework for understanding ontic vagueness. The project of the paper is two-fold. I first outline a definitional account of ontic vagueness – one that I think is an improvement on previous attempts because it remains neutral on other, independent metaphysical issues. I then develop one potential manifestation of that basic definitional structure. This is a more robust (and much less neutral) account which gives a fully classical explication of ontic vagueness via modal concepts. The overarching aim is to systematically investigate the puzzling question of what exactly it could be for the world itself to be vague
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00762.x
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Meghan Sullivan (2012). The Minimal A-Theory. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):149-174.
Elizabeth Barnes (2014). Fundamental Indeterminacy. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):339-362.

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