Moral Inference

New York, NY: Psychology Press (2017)
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Abstract

Moral Inferences is the first volume to thoroughly explore the relationship between morality and reasoning. Drawing on the expertise of world-leading researchers, this text provides ground-breaking insight into the importance of studying these distinct fields together. The volume integrates the latest research into morality with current theories in reasoning to consider the prominent role reasoning plays in everyday moral judgements. Featuring contributions on topics such as moral arguments, causal models, and dual process theory, this text provides a new perspectives on previous studies, encouraging researchers to adopt a more integrated approach in the future. Moral Inferenceswill be essential reading for students and researchers of moral psychology, specifically those interested in reasoning, rationality and decision-making.

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