Scepticism about philosophy

Ratio 23 (1):1-16 (2010)
Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00447.x
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Nathan Hanna (2015). Philosophical Success. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2109-2121.

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