Human Likeness and the Formation of Empirical Concepts

Review of Metaphysics 13 (3):383 - 395 (1960)
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Abstract

I shall add to this suggestion that what we would ordinarily think of counting as concepts--those for which we can find words --demand an extension or distribution of this likeness among those who use language together. I have little confidence in a method that would look to words for the original derivation of concepts. It seems clear that sounds or written signs that are to pass for words must be recognized as words. No signal or indication that this is what they are will gain for them this recognition, unless the signal is itself recognized. A concept, as I am thinking of it, is presupposed in any act of recognition. It is, to speak broadly, the knowing what to think of an object that may be given.

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