Animal concepts revisited: The use of self-monitoring as an empirical approach [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 51 (1):537-544 (1999)
Abstract
  Many psychologists and philosophers believe that the close correlation between human language and human concepts makes the attribution of concepts to nonhuman animals highly questionable. I argue for a three-part approach to attributing concepts to animals. The approach goes beyond the usual discrimination tests by seeking evidence for self-monitoring of discrimination errors. Such evidence can be collected without relying on language and, I argue, the capacity for error-detection can only be explained by attributing a kind of internal representation that is reasonably identified as a concept. Thus I hope to have shown that worries about the empirical intractability of concepts in languageless animals are misplaced
Keywords Animal  Concept  Epistemology  Error  Language  Representation
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Monima Chadha (2007). No Speech, Never Mind! Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):641 – 657.

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