Abstract
How does Descartes think causation operates? His definition of matter as mere geometrical extension, along with his rejection of the scholastic apparatus of substantial forms and real qualities, does not make it easy to see how there can be dynamic causal interactions in the universe. According to an influential reading, championed, for example, by Dan Garber in his Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics , Descartes “rejected the tiny souls of the schools only to replace them with one great soul, God, who . . . manipulates the bodies of the inanimate world.” Tad Schmaltz’s aim, in this wonderfully detailed and intricately argued book, is to reject this tendency to move towards an occasionalist reading of Descartes, and to show how the Cartesian system permits things in the world to have a genuine, if derivative, kind of causal power: “Descartes’s intention is to allow for a physical world that has an internal source of activity”