Online research in philosophy

Abstract By over?stressing legal analogies in ethical theory, I believe we have neglected aspects of morality that tie it closely to the development of personal responsiblity. When this relationship is realized, discrepancies sometimes claimed between self?interest and the social good dissolve. This paper defends an approach to moral education based on using responsibility as a causal means to greater autonomy or personal freedom. By holding people unconditionally or ?ascriptively? responsible, eliminating all excusing conditions, the kind of responsibility logically entailed by Intentional choosing or Inexcusable neglect can be fostered. Concrete applications and examples of what I call ascriptive responsibility are set forth throughout the paper. ?Action?regulators? are also suggested which operationalize and individuate education in responsibility still further.

In this paper the author states that education could be better defined as reception and responsibility and that this ethical relationship between educator and pupil is the root or essential element of education. The author proposes a new paradigm, the pedagogy of alterity, inspired by Le?vinas, as a different model for educational praxis and research. Education as reception and responsibility facilitates the learning of values and a moral environment in the classroom and it is a fundamental support for the pupils in the current crisis of education. In this model, education is also political complaint and commitment. Being responsible for the other, taking responsibility for the other, means accepting the socio?historical conditions of the pupil. Otherwise, we would not be referring to human beings of flesh and blood, but to spiritual entities.

References to moral education in New Zealand over the last fifteen years are traced through official and semi-official government reports, teachers’ publications, and other sources. It is argued that since 1962 there has been an increasing awareness of and concern with moral education.

The significance of the Commission on Education in New Zealand in 1962 stressed that New Zealand schools’ prime responsibility was for intellectual education, although they should also be concerned with physical, emotional, and moral development.

Since the Commission’s report it has been noticeable that subsequent reports and papers such as the Education Departments booklet Social Education, the reports from the nation-wide educational development conference and the teachers’ union publication Education in Change have indicated that the school should adopt greater responsibility in the area of moral education. The 1977 Johnson Report strongly supported the introduction of moral education in schools and precipitated considerable public debate.

Abstract Education in India is primarily the responsibility of the States. Diversity rather than uniformity characterizes the curricula, among other things, of these state school systems. Very few of the states have provided for moral education as a subject of study in their schools, although the importance of moral education is generally appreciated. This paper presents an account of the Indian thinking on the different aspects of moral education and its present position and status.

Discussion regarding education’s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education’s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ‘overriding’ to be explained. The second associates education’s ultimate aims with the intrinsic value of personal well-being. We advance reasons to doubt that these strategies are successful. The shortcomings of these strategies impute yet further urgency to the issue of how we are to ascertain and validate education’s ultimate aims.

Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism and internalism: moral responsibility does not require that one have a past but it does require that one not have certain kinds of past.

This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility.

Introduction: The metaphysics of responsibility and philosophy of education -- Moral responsibility, authenticity, and the problem of manipulation -- A novel perspective on the problem of authenticity -- Forward-looking authenticity in the internalism/externalism debate -- Authentic education, indoctrination, and moral responsibility -- Moral responsibility, hard incompatibilism, and interpersonal relationships -- On the significance of moral responsibility and love -- Love, commendability, and moral obligation -- Love, determinism, and normative education.