Abstract

The phrase 'probable cause' in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has created definitional difficulties in legal circles. Philosophical analysis and reflection can often clarify such difficulties. The meaning of probable cause can best be understood if we have some notion of its use. ;In the first part of the dissertation, I argue that probable cause is justified belief or warranted assertibility. Specific examples of probable cause are then examined in light of foundationalist and anti-foundationalist theories of epistemic justification. This examination leads to a better understanding of the doxastic dimension of probable cause. I conclude that probable cause exemplifies a contextualist theory of justification that is internalist in nature. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I argue that probable cause provides a procedural principle of distributive justice that mediates between the state and its individual citizens. This use of probable cause has its foundation in the ideology of the Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This ideology, in turn, has its philosophical foundations in Locke's theory of private property and Hume's theory of justice. These philosophical foundations continue to have important implications for modern liberal republican states