Perception versus conception : the Goldilocks test

In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ethical Progress and the Goldilocks Problem.Cynthia Gayman - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):153-161.
Truth and the goldilocks principle.John Capps - 2020 - Think 19 (55):65-74.
Reid’s View of Memorial Conception.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (3):211-226.
Dretske's conception of perception and knowledge.Gerald Doppelt - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (September):433-446.
Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed.Marina Folescu - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 52-74.
Perception and belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Evans, transparency, and Cartesianism.David Zapero - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):685-702.
A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-12-14

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fred Dretske
Last affiliation: Duke University

Citations of this work

The enactive approach: a briefer statement, with some remarks on “radical enactivism”.Alva Noë - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):957-970.
The limits of perceptual phenomenal content.Peter V. Forrest - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3725-3747.
Perceptual Learning.Connolly Kevin - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1:1-35.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references