Analyzing Explanations for Seemingly Irrational Choices

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):267-286 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

People make significant decisions in contexts of risk and uncertainty. Some of these decisions seem wise under the circumstances, and others seem like irrational choices. In both cases, people offer reasons as clarifications and explanations of these choices to others and to themselves. Argument analysis, a technique well known in philosophy and more generally in the humanities, can explicate the strands of assumptions, intermediate conclusions, data, warrants, and claims that the person articulates. But alone, argument analysis often falls short of revealing why the person’s decision makes sense to that person. Thefindings of empirical research into the influences of cognitive heuristics, the mental shortcuts we all use in decision making and problem solving, adds focus to the analysis of these choices. This paper links these two powerful analytic strategies, and provides a much fuller, more fruitful picture of explanations for seemingly irrational choices. Using an example explanation for deciding not to quit smoking, the paper makes both its methodological argument and its implicit argument for the significance of extending this analytical strategy to applied contexts. The implications of extending this analysis of everyday argument to management, health care, and education could be profound.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Cashing out the money-pump argument.Chrisoula Andreou - 2016 - Philosophical Studies (6):1-5.
Difficult choices: To agonize or not to agonize?Edna Ullmann-Margalit - 2007 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1):51-78.
On irrational guilt.Juha Räikkä - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):473 - 485.
Can We Be Justified in Believing That Humans Are Irrational?Edward Stein - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):545-565.
On Evidence and Argument in Phenomenological Research.Russell Walsh - 2012 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 12 (sup1):1-7.
Can we be justified in believing that humans are irrational?Edward Stein - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):545-565.
Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction.Michael Allingham - 2002 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alternatives in Framing and Decision Making.Bart Geurts - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):1-19.
Stich, Content, Prediction, and Explanation in Cognitive Science.Charles Wallis - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:327 - 340.
Underdetermination and the explanation of theory-acceptance: A response to Samir Okasha.Ward E. Jones - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):299 – 304.
On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2015 - In Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 94-115.
Wise choices: a spiritual guide to making life's decisions.Margaret Silf - 2007 - New York: BlueBridge. Edited by Margaret Silf.
Begging the Question.David H. Sanford - 1972 - Analysis 32 (6):197-199.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
45 (#352,980)

6 months
8 (#359,856)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?