Stich, Content, Prediction, and Explanation in Cognitive Science

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:327 - 340 (1990)
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Abstract

In this paper I consider Stich's principle of autonomy argument (From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science) as an argument that computationalism is an incorrect approach to explanation and prediction in cognitive science. After considering the principle of autonomy argument in light of several computational systems and psychological examples, I conclude that the argument is unsound. I formulate my reasons for rejecting Stich's argument as unsound into the conjunction argument. Finally, I argue that the conjunction argument is sound, and that its soundness adds additional plausibility to computationalism as an explanatory schema in cognitive science.

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Charles Wallis
California State University, Long Beach

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