Kitcher’s Theory of Reference Revisited

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 53:47-51 (2018)
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Abstract

To explain how theoretical terms can acquire and maintain ref-erence, Kitcher introduces the concepts of “mode of reference” and “reference potential”. The reference potential of an expression-type would be a function of the two basic modes of reference, the descriptive and the baptismal. Kitcher puts forward an argument: modes of reference correspond individually to each token and not to the expression-type, whereas the reference potential of a type is a compendium of modes of reference of its tokens. Different tokens of the same expression-type may be associated with different modes of reference and, therefore, some tokens of the same type could refer whereas others do not. We argue that a series of marks or of sounds became tokens of an expression-type precisely because they are instantiations of a type, and not the other way around, as Kitcher suggests. We argue that Kitcher’s main resource, to primarily link the reference to tokens rather than to expression-types, is based on a conflation that seems to have been passed over by his critics. So, both the descriptive and the baptismal basic ways of providing reference to general terms are useless to Kitcher’s theory on referring and we conclude that it is far from solving the problems it intended to overcome.

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