Knowledge, certainty and probability

Inquiry 6 (1-4):242 – 250 (1963)
Abstract
In this essay, I discuss some of the important logical principles governing the concepts of knowledge, certainty and probability. In the first section, I suggest a series of definitions of epistemic terms, employing as primitive the locution ?p is epistemi?cally possible to S? In the second section, I develop an epistemic concept of probability and compare it to the concepts of certainty and knowledge. In the third section, I relate the epistemic concepts of certainty and probability to the quantifiers of traditional logic and to a non?episteznic concept of probability. I conclude by noting similarities and differences between the two concepts of probability
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1956). Epistemic Statements and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (4):447-460.
G. H. von Wright (1951). An Essay in Modal Logic. Amsterdam, North-Holland Pub. Co..
Citations of this work BETA
Douglas Odegard (1977). Conjunctivity, Knowledge, and Probability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):206 – 208.
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