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  1. Marshall Abrams, Toward a Mechanistic Interpretation of Probability.
    I sketch a new objective interpretation of probability, called "mechanistic probability", and more specifically what I call "far-flung frequency (FFF) mechanistic probability". FFF mechanistic probability is defined in terms of facts about the causal structure of devices and certain sets of collections of frequencies in the actual world. The relevant kind of causal structure is a generalization of what Strevens (2003) calls microconstancy. Though defined partly in terms of frequencies, FFF mechanistic probability avoids many drawbacks of well-known frequency theories. It (...)
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  2. D. Albert (1997). On the Character of Statistical-Mechanical Probabilities'. Philosophy of Science 64.
  3. Lennart Åqvist (2007). An Interpretation of Probability in the Law of Evidence Based on Pro-Et-Contra Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):391-410.
    The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic analysis (...)
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  4. A. J. Ayer (1972). Probability and Evidence. [London]Macmillan.
  5. E. Beth (1946). On the Interpretation of Probability Calculi Ernest Nagel. Synthese 5 (1-2):92-95.
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  6. Craig Callender (2007). The Emergence and Interpretation of Probability in Bohmian Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):351-370.
    A persistent question about the deBroglie–Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics concerns the understanding of Born’s rule in the theory. Where do the quantum mechanical probabilities come from? How are they to be interpreted? These are the problems of emergence and interpretation. In more than 50 years no consensus regarding the answers has been achieved. Indeed, mirroring the foundational disputes in statistical mechanics, the answers to each question are surprisingly diverse. This paper is an opinionated survey of this literature. While acknowledging (...)
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  7. Rudolf Carnap (1945). The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5 (4):513-532.
  8. Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall (2006). Probability. In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  9. Roman Frigg, Probability in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics.
    In two recent papers Barry Loewer (2001, 2004) has suggested to interpret probabilities in statistical mechanics as Humean chances in David Lewis’ (1994) sense. I first give a precise formulation of this proposal, then raise two fundamental objections, and finally conclude that these can be overcome only at the price of interpreting these probabilities epistemically.
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  10. Maria Carla Galavotti, Kinds of Probabilism.
    The first part of the article deals with the theories of probability and induction put forward by Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap. It will be argued that, despite fundamental differences, Carnap's and Reichenbach's views on probability are closely linked with the problem of meaning generated by logical empiricism, and are characterized by the logico-semantical approach typical of this philosophical current. Moreover, their notions of probability are both meant to combine a logical and an empirical element. Of these, Carnap over the (...)
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  11. Maria Carla Galavotti (1989). Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261.
    Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either.
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  12. Donald Gillies (2000). Philosophical Theories of Probability. Routledge.
    This book presents a comprehensive and systematic account of the various philosophical theories of probability and explains how they are related. It covers the classical, logical, subjective, frequency, and propensity views of probability. Donald Gillies even provides a new theory of probability -the intersubjective-a development of the subjective theory. He argues for a pluralist view, where there can be more than one valid interpretation of probabiltiy, each appropriate in a different context. The relation of the various interpretations to the Bayesian (...)
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  13. Alan Hájek, Interpretations of Probability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. Alan Hájek (2007). The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too. Synthese 156 (3):563--585.
    The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference (...)
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  15. William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (2007). Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. College Publications.
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  16. Michael Heidelberger (2001). Origins of the Logical Theory of Probability: Von Kries, Wittgenstein, Waismann. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (2):177 – 188.
    The physiologist and neo-Kantian philosopher Johannes von Kries (1853-1928) wrote one of the most philosophically important works on the foundation of probability after P.S. Laplace and before the First World War, his Principien der Wohrscheinlich-keitsrechnung (1886, repr. 1927). In this book, von Kries developed a highly original interpretation of probability, which maintains it to be both logical and objectively physical. After presenting his approach I shall pursue the influence it had on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann. It seems that von (...)
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  17. Jürgen Humburg (1986). Foundations of a New System of Probability Theory. Topoi 5 (1):39-50.
    The aim of my book is to explain the content of the different notions of probability.Based on a concept of logical probability, which is modified as compared with Carnap, we succeed by means of the mathematical results of de Finetti in defining the concept of statistical probability.
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  18. Hugues Leblanc (1962/2006). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. Dover Publications.
    This evenhanded treatment addresses the decades-old dispute among probability theorists, asserting that both statistical and inductive probabilities may be treated as sentence-theoretic measurements, and that the latter qualify as estimates of the former. Beginning with a survey of the essentials of sentence theory and of set theory, the author examines statistical probabilities, showing that statistical probabilities may be passed on to sentences, and thereby qualify as truth-values. An exploration of inductive probabilities follows, demonstrating their reinterpretation as estimates of truth-values. Each (...)
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  19. Peter Milne (1986). Can There Be a Realist Single-Case Interpretation of Probability? Erkenntnis 25 (2):129 - 132.
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  20. Paul K. Moser (1988). The Foundations of Epistemological Probability. Erkenntnis 28 (2):231 - 251.
    Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of (...)
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  21. Jan Plato (1982). The Significance of the Ergodic Decomposition of Stationary Measures for the Interpretation of Probability. Synthese 53 (3):419-432.
    De Finetti's representation theorem is a special case of the ergodic decomposition of stationary probability measures. The problems of the interpretation of probabilities centred around de Finetti's theorem are extended to this more general situation. The ergodic decomposition theorem has a physical background in the ergodic theory of dynamical systems. Thereby the interpretations of probabilities in the cases of de Finetti's theorem and its generalization and in ergodic theory are systematically connected to each other.
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  22. Karl R. Popper (2009/2012). The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge. Routledge.
    A brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance -- Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth Exposition [1933] -- Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis) -- Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge -- Formulation of the Problem -- The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation -- Deductivtsm and Inductivism -- Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions -- Rationalism and empiricism-deductivism (...)
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  23. T. V. Reeves (1988). A Theory of Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):161-182.
    This paper argues that probability is not an objective phenomenon that can be identified with either the configurational properties of sequences, or the dynamic properties of sources that generate sequences. Instead, it is proposed that probability is a function of subjective as well as objective conditions. This is explained by formulating a nation of probability that is a modification of Laplace‘s classical enunciation. This definition is then used to explain why probability is strongly associated with disordered sequences, and is also (...)
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  24. Federica Russo (2006). Salmon and Van Fraassen on the Existence of Unobservable Entities: A Matter of Interpretation of Probability. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 11 (3):221-247.
    A careful analysis of Salmon’s Theoretical Realism and van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism shows that both share a common origin: the requirement of literal construal of theories inherited by the Standard View. However, despite this common starting point, Salmon and van Fraassen strongly disagree on the existence of unobservable entities. I argue that their different ontological commitment towards the existence of unobservables traces back to their different views on the interpretation of probability via different conceptions of induction. In fact, inferences to (...)
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  25. Niall Shanks (1993). Time and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 24 (2):293 - 302.
    The prime concern of this paper is with the nature of probability. It is argued that questions concerning the nature of probability are intimately linked to questions about the nature of time. The case study here concerns the single case propensity interpretation of probability. It is argued that while this interpretation of probability has a natural place in the quantum theory, the metaphysical picture of time to be found in relativity theory is incompatible with such a treatment of probability.
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  26. Lawrence Sklar (1970). Is Probability a Dispositional Property? Journal of Philosophy 67 (11):355-366.
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  27. Patrick Suppes (2010). The Nature of Probability. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):89 - 102.
    The thesis of this article is that the nature of probability is centered on its formal properties, not on any of its standard interpretations. Section 2 is a survey of Bayesian applications. Section 3 focuses on two examples from physics that seem as completely objective as other physical concepts. Section 4 compares the conflict between subjective Bayesians and objectivists about probability to the earlier strident conflict in physics about the nature of force. Section 5 outlines a pragmatic approach to the (...)
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  28. James E. Tomberlin (1974). J. L. Mackie's Truth, Probability, and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):591-592.
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  29. David Wallace (2006). Epistemology Quantized: Circumstances in Which We Should Come to Believe in the Everett Interpretation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):655-689.
    I consider exactly what is involved in a solution to the probability problem of the Everett interpretation, in the light of recent work on applying considerations from decision theory to that problem. I suggest an overall framework for understanding probability in a physical theory, and conclude that this framework, when applied to the Everett interpretation, yields the result that that interpretation satisfactorily solves the measurement problem. Introduction What is probability? 2.1 Objective probability and the Principal Principle 2.2 Three ways of (...)
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  30. Margaret D. Wilson (1971). Possibility, Propensity, and Chance: Some Doubts About the Hacking Thesis. Journal of Philosophy 68 (19):610-617.
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Classical Probability
  1. Ernest W. Adams (1996). Four Probability-Preserving Properties of Inferences. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1):1 - 24.
    Different inferences in probabilistic logics of conditionals 'preserve' the probabilities of their premisses to different degrees. Some preserve certainty, some high probability, some positive probability, and some minimum probability. In the first case conclusions must have probability I when premisses have probability 1, though they might have probability 0 when their premisses have any lower probability. In the second case, roughly speaking, if premisses are highly probable though not certain then conclusions must also be highly probable. In the third case (...)
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  2. Leon Cohen (1966). Can Quantum Mechanics Be Formulated as a Classical Probability Theory? Philosophy of Science 33 (4):317-322.
    It is shown that quantum mechanics cannot be formulated as a stochastic theory involving a probability distribution function of position and momentum. This is done by showing that the most general distribution function which yields the proper quantum mechanical marginal distributions cannot consistently be used to predict the expectations of observables if phase space integration is used. Implications relating to the possibility of establishing a "hidden" variable theory of quantum mechanics are discussed.
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  3. David Ellerman, On Classical Finite Probability Theory as a Quantum Probability Calculus.
    This paper shows how the classical finite probability theory (with equiprobable outcomes) can be reinterpreted and recast as the quantum probability calculus of a pedagogical or "toy" model of quantum mechanics over sets (QM/sets). There are two parts. The notion of an "event" is reinterpreted from being an epistemological state of indefiniteness to being an objective state of indefiniteness. And the mathematical framework of finite probability theory is recast as the quantum probability calculus for QM/sets. The point is not to (...)
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  4. G. Gerlich (1981). Some Remarks on Classical Probability Theory in Quantum Mechanics. Erkenntnis 16 (3):335 - 338.
  5. Michal Marczyk & Leszek Wronski, Exhaustive Classication of Finite Classical Probability Spaces with Regard to the Notion of Causal Up-to-N-Closedness.
    Extending the ideas from (Hofer-Szabó and Rédei [2006]), we introduce the notion of causal up-to-n-closedness of probability spaces. A probability space is said to be causally up-to-n-closed with respect to a relation of independence R_ind iff for any pair of correlated events belonging to R_ind the space provides a common cause or a common cause system of size at most n. We prove that a finite classical probability space is causally up-to-3-closed w.r.t. the relation of logical independence iff its probability (...)
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  6. Joseph D. Sneed (1970). Quantum Mechanics and Classical Probability Theory. Synthese 21 (1):34 - 64.
Frequentism
  1. Marshall Abrams, Short-Run Mechanistic Probability.
    This paper sketches a concept of higher-level objective probability (“short-run mechanistic probability”, SRMP) inspired partly by a style of explanation of relative frequencies known as the “method of arbitrary functions”. SRMP has the potential to fill the need for a theory of objective probability which has wide application at higher levels and which gives probability causal connections to observed relative frequency (without making it equivalent to relative frequency). Though this approach provides probabilities on a space of event types, it does (...)
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  2. Max Albert (2005). Should Bayesians Bet Where Frequentists Fear to Tread? Philosophy of Science 72 (4):584-593.
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  3. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2008). Reichenbach's Posits Reposited. Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  4. J. Berkovitz (2001). On Chance in Causal Loops. Mind 110 (437):1-23.
    A common line of argument for the impossibility of closed causal loops is that they would involve causal paradoxes. The usual reply is that such loops impose heavy consistency constraints on the nature of causal connections in them; constraints that are overlooked by the impossibility arguments. Hugh Mellor has maintained that arguments for the possibility of causal loops also overlook some constraints, which are related to the chances (single-case, objective probabilities) that causes give to their effects. And he argues that (...)
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  5. Noëul Bonneuil (2004). Repertoires, Frequentism, and Predictability. History and Theory 43 (1):117–123.
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  6. Mark R. Crovelli, “A Challenge to Ludwig von Mises's Theory of Probability”.
    The most interesting and completely overlooked aspect of Ludwig von Mises’s theory of probability is the total absence of any explicit definition for probability in his theory. This paper examines Mises’s theory of probability in light of the fact that his theory possesses no definition for probability. It is argued, [...].
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  7. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Probability and Randomness. In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  8. Antony Eagle (ed.) (2010). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  9. Bas C. Fraassen (1977). Relative Frequencies. Synthese 34 (2):133 - 166.
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  10. Maria Carla Galavotti (1995). Operationism, Probability and Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Science 1 (1):99-118.
    This paper investigates the kind of empiricism combined with an operationalist perspective that, in the first decades of our Century, gave rise to a turning point in theoretical physics and in probability theory. While quantum mechanics was taking shape, the classical (Laplacian) interpretation of probability gave way to two divergent perspectives: frequentism and subjectivism. Frequentism gained wide acceptance among theoretical physicists. Subjectivism, on the other hand, was never held to be a serious candidate for application to physical theories, despite the (...)
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  11. Amit Hagar & Giuseppe Sergioli (forthcoming). Counting Steps: A Finitist Interpretation of Objective Probability in Physics. Epistemologia.
    We propose a new interpretation of objective deterministic chances in statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set--up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the 'distance' (in terms of physical resources) from a physical state to another, and (3) the size of the set of time--complexity functions that are compatible with the physical (...)
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  12. Alan Hájek (2009). Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism. Erkenntnis 70 (2):211 - 235.
    This is the sequel to my "Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism" (Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A's among the B's would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B's. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I consider various frequentist responses, (...)
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  13. Alan Hájek (2009). Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism. Erkenntnis 70 (2):211 - 235.
    This is the sequel to my “Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” ( Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A ’s among the B ’s would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B ’s. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I (...)
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  14. Alan Hájek (1996). “Mises Redux” — Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):209--27.
    According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position.
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