A world of truthmakers

In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. 18--105 (2007)
Abstract
I will present and criticise the two theories of truthmaking David Armstrong offers us in Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), show to what extent they are incompatible and identify troublemakers for both of them, a notorious – Factualism, the view that the world is a world of states of affairs – and a more recent one – the view that every predication is necessary. Factualism, combined with truthmaker necessitarianism – ‘truthmaking is necessitation’ – leads Armstrong to an all-embracing totality state of affairs that necessitates not only everything that is the case but also everything else – that which is not the case, that which is merely possible or even impossible. All the things so dear to realists – rocks, natural properties, real persons – become mere abstractions from this ontological monster. The view that every predication is necessary does in some sense the opposite: it does away with totality states of affairs and, arguably, also with states of affairs. We have particulars and universals, partially identical and necessarily connected to everything else. Just by the existence of anything, everything is necessitated – the whole world mirrored in every monad. Faced with the choice between these two equally unappealing alternatives, I suggest returning to Armstrong’s more empiricist past: the world is not an all-inclusive One, nor necessitated by every single particular and every single universal, but a plurality of particulars and universals, interconnected by a contingent and internal relation of exemplification. While a close variant, truthmaker essentialism, can perhaps be saved, this means giving up on truthmaker necessitarianism. This, I think, what it takes to steer a clear empiricist course between the Scylla of Spinozist general factness and the Charybdis of a Leibnizian overdose of brute necessities.
Keywords truthmaking  universals  truthmaking necessitarianism  totality facts  qua objects
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
    John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
    Greg Restall (2000). Modelling Truthmaking. Logique Et Analyse 43:211-230.
    David Liggins (2005). Truthmakers and Explanation. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 105--115.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    138 ( #4,701 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    6 ( #17,284 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.