David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244 (2006)
In recent work on truth and truthmaking, D. M. Armstrong has defended a version of 'truthmaker necessitarianism', the doctrine that truths necessitate truthmakers. Truthmaker necessitarianism, he contends, requires the postulation of 'totality facts', which serve as ingredients of truthmakers for general truths and negative truths, and propositions, which function as the fundamental truth bearers. I argue that neither totality facts nor propositions need figure in an account of truthmaking, and suggest that both are artifacts stemming, albeit in different ways, from an ontologically shady 'linguisticizing' tendency to conflate features of descriptions and features of what is described.
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
John Bigelow (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Damian Cox (1997). The Trouble with Truth-Makers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):45–62.
John Heil (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Tallant (2010). Not a Total Failure. Philosophia 38 (4):795-810.
Karen Green (2009). Necessitating Nominalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):193-196.
Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Subtraction of Powers. Erkenntnis 79 (1):127-146.
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