Justification as truth-finding efficiency: How ockham's razor works

Minds and Machines 14 (4):485-505 (2004)
I propose that empirical procedures, like computational procedures, are justified in terms of truth-finding efficiency. I contrast the idea with more standard philosophies of science and illustrate it by deriving Ockham's razor from the aim of minimizing dramatic changes of opinion en route to the truth.
Keywords Computer Science   Philosophy of Mind   Artificial Intelligence   Systems Theory, Control   Interdisciplinary Studies
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DOI 10.1023/B:MIND.0000045993.31233.63
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