Hume, Probability, Lotteries and Miracles

Hume Studies 16 (1):67-74 (1990)
Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0467
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Richard Otte (1993). Schlesinger and Miracles. Faith and Philosophy 10 (1):93-98.
George I. Mavrodes (1998). David Hume and the Probability of Miracles. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (3):167-182.
Ruth Weintraub (1996). The Credibility of Miracles. Philosophical Studies 82 (3):359 - 375.
John King-Farlow (1982). Historical Insights on Miracles: Babbage, Hume, Aquinas. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (4):209 - 218.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

13 ( #194,523 of 1,725,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #147,227 of 1,725,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.