Hume, Probability, Lotteries and Miracles

Hume Studies 16 (1):67-74 (1990)
Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails
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