Hume on miracles: Interpretation and criticism

Philosophy Compass 2 (4):611–624 (2007)
Philosophers continue to debate about David Hume’s case against the rationality of belief in miracles. This article clarifies semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical questions addressed in the controversy. It also explains the main premises of Hume’s argument and discusses criticisms of them. The article concludes that one’s evaluation of Hume’s argument will depend on one’s views about (a) the definitions of ’miracle’ and ’natural law’; (b) the type of reasoning one ought to employ to determine the probability that a particular miracle claim is true; and (c) whether reasonable people proportion their beliefs about the occurrence of miracles to their evidence
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00088.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Hume (2009). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press 112.
Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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