Jeffrey Conditionalization Permits Undermining

Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-7 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

It has frequently been argued recently that Jeffrey Conditionalization (JC) does not permit undermining. For JC to be inapplicable in cases where the evidence could be undermined would severely compromise JC’s range. However, this paper contends that the argument fails to show that JC cannot accommodate undermining. This response turns on using the proper partition to capture the direct impact of our evidence in redistributing our credences.

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Marc Lange
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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