Graduate studies at Western
Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):249-264 (2008)
|Abstract||In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.|
|Keywords||ontology, F. H. Bradley, Russell|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Parker (1984). Bradley's Paradox and Russell's Theory of Relations. Philosophy Research Archives 10:261-273.
Richard Gaskin (2008). The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford University Press.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2010). Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden's Theory of States of Affairs. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):63-80.
Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Propositions United. Dialectica 64 (2):289-301.
Fraser MacBride (2011). Relations and Truthmaking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):161-179.
Scuola Normale Superiore (2010). Leibniz and 'Bradley's Regress'. The Leibniz Review 20:1-12.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Truth Breakers. Topoi 29 (2):153-163.
Francesco Orilia (2009). Bradley's Regress and Ungrounded Dependence Chains: A Reply to Cameron. Dialectica 63 (3):333-341.
Added to index2009-11-23
Total downloads21 ( #65,479 of 738,851 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,338 of 738,851 )
How can I increase my downloads?