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  1. Louise M. Antony (2003). Who's Afraid of Disjunctive Properties? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):1-21.
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  2. Paul Audi (2012). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
    According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. (...)
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  3. Derek Ball (2011). Property Identities and Modal Arguments. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (13).
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
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  4. Elizabeth Barnes (2005). Vagueness in Sparseness: A Study in Property Ontology. Analysis 65 (288):315–321.
    In recent literature on vagueness, writers have noted that more ‘plentiful’ theories of properties – those that postulate genuine properties corresponding to the classically vague predicates like ‘bald’ and ‘heap’ – appear straightforwardly committed to ontic vagueness. In this paper, however, I will argue that worries of ontic vagueness are not specific to ‘plentiful’ accounts of properties. The classically ‘sparse’ theories of properties – Universals and tropes – will, I contend, be subject to similar difficulties.
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  5. Sam Baron, Richard Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller (2013). What is a Negative Property? Philosophy 88 (01):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers (...)
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  6. William A. Bauer (2012). Four Theories of Pure Dispositions. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge. 139-162.
    The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of the being of (...)
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  7. George Bealer (1989). On the Identification of Properties and Propositional Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.
    Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would (...)
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  8. George Bealer (1983). Completeness in the Theory of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):415-426.
    Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. It turns out that the first-order theory of PRPs that results when first-order logic is supplemented with a generalized intensional abstraction operation is complete. The construction involves the development of an intensional algebraic semantic method that does not appeal to possible worlds, but rather takes PRPs as primitive entities. This allows for a satisfactory treatment of both the modalities and the (...)
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  9. George Bealer (1979). Theories of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 76 (11):634-648.
    This is the only complete logic for properties, relations, and propositions (PRPS) that has been formulated to date. First, an intensional abstraction operation is adjoined to first-order quantifier logic, Then, a new algebraic semantic method is developed. The heuristic used is not that of possible worlds but rather that of PRPS taken at face value. Unlike the possible worlds approach to intensional logic, this approach yields a logic for intentional (psychological) matters, as well as modal matters. At the close of (...)
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  10. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions. Dialectica 70 (1).
    The problem of profligate omissions is as follows: suppose that the gardener promises to water your plant while you are out of town, the gardener fails to water it, and the plant dies. Intuitively, the gardener's failing to water the plant is a cause of the plant's death. But the Queen of England also failed to water the plant, and the counterfactual "Had the Queen of England not failed to water the plant, the plant would not have died" is true. (...)
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  11. Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
    Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
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  12. Ben Blumson, Pictures and Properties.
    It’s a platitude that a picture is realistic to the degree to which it resembles what it represents (in relevant respects). But if properties are abundant and degrees of resemblance are proportions of properties in common, then the degree of resemblance between different particulars is constant (or undefined), which is inconsonant with the platitude. This paper argues this problem should be resolved by revising the analysis of degrees of resemblance in terms of proportion of properties in common, and not by (...)
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  13. Ben Blumson, The Metaphysical Significance of the Ugly-Duckling Theorem.
    According to Satosi Watanabe's "theorem of the ugly duckling", the number of (possible) predicates satisfied by any two different particulars is a constant, which does not depend on the choice of the two particulars. If the number of (possible) predicates satisfied by two particulars is their number of properties in common, and the degree of resemblance between two particulars is a function of their number of properties in common, then it follows that the degree of resemblance between any two different (...)
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  14. Andrew Botterell (1998). Mellor on Negative Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526.
    DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood as (...)
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  15. Phillip Bricker (1996). Properties. In Donald Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement. SImon and Schuster Macmillan.
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  16. Jeffrey Brower (2001). Relations Without Polyadic Properties: Albert the Great on the Nature and Ontological Status of Relations. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (3):225-257.
    I think it would be fair to say that, until about 1900, philosophers were generally reluctant to admit the existence of what are nowadays called polyadic properties (for our purposes we may think of a polyadic property as a property whose instances can belong to two or more subjects at once).1 It is important to recognize, however, that this reluctance on the part of pre-twentieth-century philosophers did not prevent them from theorizing about relations. On the contrary, philosophers from the ancient (...)
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  17. Jeffrey E. Brower (1998). Abelard's Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition. Review of Metaphysics 51 (3):605-631.
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  18. Albert Casullo (1984). Conjunctive Properties Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):289 – 291.
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  19. Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
    One view of the nature of properties has been crystallized in recent debate by an identity thesis proposed by Shoemaker. The general idea is that there is for behaviour. Well-known criticisms of this approach, however, remain unanswered, and the details of its connections to laws nothing more to being a particular causal property than conferring certain dispositions of nature and the precise ontology of causal properties stand in need of development. This paper examines and defends a dispositional essentialist account of (...)
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  20. Roderick M. Chisholm (1952). Ducasse's Theory of Properties and Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (1):42-56.
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  21. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2005). Internal, External and Intra-Individual Relations. Axiomathes 15 (4):487-512.
    In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we (...)
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  22. Nino B. Cocchiarella (1972). Properties as Individuals in Formal Ontology. Noûs 6 (2):165-187.
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  23. Irving M. Copi (1958). Objects, Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus. Mind 67 (266):145-165.
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  24. Charles B. Cross (2002). Armstrong and the Problem of Converse Relations. Erkenntnis 56 (2):215 - 227.
    In A World of States of Affairs(Cambridge University Press, 1997) David Armstrong offers acomprehensive metaphysics based on the thesis that the world consistsof states of affairs. Among the entities postulated by Armstrong's theory are relations, including non-symmetrical relations, and whileArmstrong does not agree with Russell that all relations have adirection or definite order among their places, he does explicitlyacknowledge that the slots of a non-symmetrical relation have adefinite order or direction. I first show that non-symmetricalrelations pose a problem for Armstrong's (...)
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  25. Troy Cross (2012). Goodbye, Humean Supervenience. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153.
    Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
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  26. Xabier de Donato Rodríguez & Marek Polanski (2006). Superveniencia, propiedades maximales y teoría de modelos (Supervenience, Maximal Properties, and Model Theory). Theoria 21 (3):257-276.
    En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...)
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  27. Dennis Earl (2006). Concepts and Properties. Metaphysica 7 (1):67-85.
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  28. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  29. Michael Esfeld (ed.) (2006). John Heil: Symposium on His Ontological Point of View. Ontos.
    The volume covers a number of the most hotly debated issues in today's metaphysics and moves the discussion on in several important aspects.
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  30. Harty Field (2004). The Consistency of the Naïve Theory of Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):78 - 104.
    If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. (...)
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  31. J. N. Findlay (1936). Relational Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):176 – 190.
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  32. Kit Fine (1977). Properties, Propositions and Sets. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):135 - 191.
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  33. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View&Quot;. In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object (e.g. a field containing modes or properties which we perceive as manifest everyday objects) require the qualitative (...)
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  34. Peter Forrest (1990). New Problems with Repeatable Properties and with Change. Noûs 24 (4):543-556.
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  35. Bryan Frances (1996). Plato's Response to the Third Man Argument in the Paradoxical Exercise of the Parmenides. Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):47-64.
  36. Eric Funkhouser (2006). The Determinable-Determinate Relation. Noûs 40 (3):548–569.
    The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation (...)
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  37. Cody Gilmore (2003). In Defence of Spatially Related Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):420-428.
    Immanent universals, being wholly present wherever they are instantiated, are capable of both multi-location and co-location. As a result, they can become involved in some bizarre situations, situations whose contradictory appearance cannot be dispelled by any of the relativizing maneuvers familiar to metaphysicials as solutions to the problem of change. Douglas Ehring takes this to be a fatal problem for immanent universals, but I do not. Although the old relativizing maneuvers don't solve the problem, I propose a new one that (...)
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  38. Reinhardt Grossmann (1972). Russell's Paradox and Complex Properties. Noûs 6 (2):153-164.
    The author argues that the primary lesson of the so-Called logical and semantical paradoxes is that certain entities do not exist, Entities of which we mistakenly but firmly believe that they must exist. In particular, Russell's paradox teaches us that there is no such thing as the property which every property has if and only if it does not have itself. Why should anyone think that such a property must exist and, Hence, Conceive of russell's argument as a paradox rather (...)
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  39. P. M. S. Hacker (1981). Events and the Exemplification of Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (124):242-247.
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  40. B. Hale (2013). Properties and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic. Philosophia Mathematica 21 (2):133-156.
    This paper defends a deflationary conception of properties, according to which a property exists if and only if there could be a predicate with appropriate satisfaction conditions. I argue that purely general properties and relations necessarily exist and discuss the bearing of this conception of properties on the interpretation of higher-order logic and on Quine's charge that higher-order logic is ‘set theory in sheep's clothing’. On my approach, the usual semantics involves a false assimilation of the logic to set theory. (...)
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  41. John Harvey (2007). Neutral Monism and the Social Character of Consciousness. Philosophy Today 51 (1):52-59.
    After thousands of years of work, the mind-body problem endures as one of the most tantalizing issues in metaphysics. For my purposes I formulate the question as: What is the relation between consciousness and matter? The solution to the mind-body problem that I offer is a version of neutral monism, the view that mental and physical events are both to be derived from some stuff that in itself is neither physical nor mental. This paper specifies the conditions under which consciousness (...)
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  42. Katherine Hawley (1998). Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Between Physical Objects and Times. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216.
    Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic (...)
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  43. John Hawthorne (2006). Quantity in Lewisian Metaphysics. In , Metaphysical Essays. Oxford University Press. 229-237.
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  44. Eric Hiddleston (2011). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415.
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
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  45. Vera Hoffmann (2006). Can Heil's Ontological Conception Accommodate Complex Properties? In Michael Esfeld (ed.), John Heil. Symposium on his Ontological Point of View. ontos verlag.
    A central tenet of Heil's ontological conception is a no-levels account of reality, according to which there is just one class of basic properties and relations, while all higher-level entities are configurations of these base-level entities. I argue that if this picture is not to collapse into an eliminativist picture of the world – which, I contend, should be avoided –, Heil's ontological framework has to be supplemented by an independent theory of which configurations of basic entities should count as (...)
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  46. Michael Anthony Istvan (2013). Análisis Nominalista de Una Entidad Que Está Siendo Caracterizada / “Nominalist Analyses of an Entity Being Charactered. Discusiones Filosóficas 21 (July-December):87-93.
    This paper is intended primarily as a reference tool for participants in the debate between realism and nominalism concerning universals. It provides an exhaustive catalogue of the basic analyses of an entity being charactered that nominalists can employ in both a constituent and nonconstituent ontology.
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  47. Michael Anthony Istvan (2011). On the Possibility of Exactly Similar Tropes. Abstracta 6 (2):158-177.
    In this paper I attempt to show, against certain versions of trope theory, that properties with analyzable particularity cannot be merely exactly similar: such properties are either particularized properties (tropes) that are dissimilar to every any other trope, or else universalized properties (universals). I argue that each of the most viable standard and nonstandard particularizers that can be employed to secure the numerical difference between exactly similar properties can only succeed in grounding the particularity of properties, that is, in having (...)
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  48. S. Korner (1954). Individuals and Properties. Mind 63 (251):380 - 383.
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  49. S. Körner (1954). Discussions: Individuals and Properties. Mind 63 (251):380-383.
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  50. S. Körner (1954). Individuals and Properties. Mind 63 (251):380-383.
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