Inquiry 5 (1-4):260-264 (1962)
|Abstract||A version of the so?called paradox of analysis is enunciated which involves two principles of synonymy, referred to respectively as that of substitution and that of triviality. It is argued that for most ?familiar? concepts of synonymy the former principle can be maintained whereas the latter one has to be rejected. I deal with some solutions to the paradox that have been proposed or discussed by Carnap, Lewy, Feyerabend and Hare, and adhere to Carnap's view that the puzzle arises from the use of unclarified and imprecise notions of synonymy|
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