From physics to physicalism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press (2001)
The appeal of materialism lies precisely in this, in its claim to be natural metaphysics within the bounds of science. That a doctrine which promises to gratify our ambition (to know the noumenal) and our caution (not to be unscientific) should have great appeal is hardly something to be wondered at. (Putnam (1983), p.210) Materialism says that all facts, in particular all mental facts, obtain in virtue of the spatio- temporal distribution, and properties, of matter. It was, as Putnam says, “metaphysics within the bounds of science”, but only so long as science was thought to say that the world is made out of matter.1 In this century physicists have learned that there is more in the world than matter and, in any case, matter isn’t quite what it seemed to be. For this reason many philosophers who think that metaphysics should be informed by science advocate physicalism in place of materialism. Physicalism claims that all facts obtain in virtue of the distribution of the fundamental entities and properties –whatever they turn out to be- of completed fundamental physics. Later I will discuss a more precise formulation. But not all contemporary philosophers embrace physicalism. Some- and though a minority not a small or un-influential one- think that physicalism is rather the metaphysics for an unjustified scientism; i.e. it is scientistic metaphysics. Those among them that think that physicalism can be clearly formulated think that it characterizes a
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Schaffer (2016). Grounding in the Image of Causation. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
Timothy O'Connor (2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Noûs 39 (4):658-678.
Sophie Gibb (2015). The Causal Closure Principle. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.
Similar books and articles
Andrew Melnyk (2006). Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):127-55.
A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press
Alyssa Ney (2008). Physicalism as an Attitude. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):1 - 15.
Barbara Montero (2006). Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World. Erkentnis 64 (2):177-191.
Terence E. Horgan (1981). Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics. Synthese 49 (December):395-413.
Agustin Vicente (2011). Current Physics and 'the Physical'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
Robin Brown & James Ladyman (2009). Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38.
Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). What is Physicalism? Ratio 22 (3):291-307.
S. Crook (2001). Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the 'Physical': Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-360.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads1 ( #750,866 of 1,790,408 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #433,815 of 1,790,408 )
How can I increase my downloads?