Philosophical Foundations of Criminalization: Analysis of Moral Vices from the Perspective of the Theory of Self-Government and the Principle of Harm

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 24 (1):137-158 (2022)
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Abstract

As a normative ethics theory, virtue ethics theory can present a criterion for criminalization. The revival of this theory brought about a great new change in new ethics philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. Its effects on criminalization are just like the two sides of a coin. On the one hand, it has the capacity of promoting ethics to reach its climax and even act as a permit for criminal intervention in the internal qualities of the individuals and on the other hand, it can decriminalize most of the vicious actions in order to make citizens virtuous.In the field of the philosophy of the law of virtue, the theory of the ethics of virtue is used for the philosophical justification of criminalization. Therefore, in order to present a virtuous criminal theory, special attention is paid to moral vices. In the theory of virtuous criminalism, we are faced with two main axes: one, flourishing, and the second, vice. The presentation of a legislative theory in the philosophy of virtue-based law takes into account human flourishing. Proponents of liberalism, on the other hand, argue that criminalizing moral depravity violates privacy; while the problem is not simple. For this reason, the criminalization of vicious behavior faces challenges including the threat of self-ownership and the justification of these behaviors from the perspective of the principle of harm. The main question now is, to what extent is the criminalization of moral vices in the context of the theory of self-government? One might also ask how virtuous criminal theory can be justified by a reading of the principle of harm. The present paper has achieved the following approach with a descriptive-analytical method: The criminalization of some moral vices violates the right of citizens to self-government. Therefore, criminalizing these behaviors will not be justified. On the other hand, from the perspective of the theory of virtuous criminalism, moral vice is not a sufficient and even necessary condition for criminalization. For this reason, assuming that the criminalization of a vice is justified on the basis of a reading of the principle of harm, it can not necessarily be claimed that the application of criminal law against this behavior is effective. In addition, the purpose of this study is to explain the limits and challenges of the theory of virtuous criminalism in the context of the theory of self-government and the principle of harm. In addition, in this article, readers are introduced to the concerns of liberals. And they will realize that criminalization in the context of virtue-based philosophy of law does not necessarily violate privacy, that is, we will not face maximum criminalization. In addition to the analysis of the nature of virtue ethics, the present thesis dissertation reviews argumentative methods of virtuous criminalization in the context of virtue-oriented criminal law jurisprudence and criticizes hurdles and methods of creating a liberal approach.

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Life's Dominion.Melissa Lane & Ronald Dworkin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):413.
Legal Paternalism.Joel Feinberg - 1971 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):105 - 124.
Liberalism and Prostitution.Peter de Marneffe - 2009 - New York, US: Oup Usa.

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