Ethics 116 (3):525-551 (2006)
|Abstract||In recent years, there has been a flurry of work on the metaphysics of race. While it is now widely accepted that races do not share robust, bio-behavioral essences, opinions differ over what, if anything, race is. Recent work has been divided between three apparently quite different answers. A variety of theorists argue for racial skepticism, the view that races do not exist at all.[iv] A second group defends racial constructionism, holding that races are in some way socially constructed.[v],[vi] And a third group maintains racial population naturalism, the view that races may exist as biologically salient populations albeit ones that do not have the biologically determined social significance once imputed to them.[vii] The three groups thus seem to disagree fundamentally upon the metaphysical character of race.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Joshua Glasgow (2008). On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):333–358.
Ron Sundstrom (2002). Race as a Human Kind. Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (1):91-115.
Robin O. Andreasen (2000). Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct? Philosophy of Science 67 (3):666.
Lisa Gannett (2004). The Biological Reification of Race. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):323-345.
Jonathan Kaplan & Massimo Pigliucci (2003). On the Concept of Biological Race and its Applicability to Humans. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):S294-S304.
Massimo Pigliucci & Jonathan Kaplan (2003). On the Concept of Biological Race and its Applicability to Humans. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1161-1172.
Robin O. Andreasen (1998). A New Perspective on the Race Debate. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):199-225.
Ron Mallon & Daniel Kelly (2012). Making Race Out of Nothing : Psychologically Constrained Social Roles. In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads75 ( #10,829 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,729 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?